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Evolution, Knowledge and Revelation

By the same author

EVOLUTION AND THE NEED OF ATONEMENT

EVOLUTION AND SPIRITUAL LIFE

EVOLUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

BEAUTY AND THE BEAST

ETC.

Cambridge University Press

Evolution, Knowledge and Revelation

Being the Hulsean Lectures delivered before the University of Cambridge, 1923–24

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AD MAIOREM DEI GLORIAM

PREFACE

SINCE writing these lectures I have read Giovanni Gentile's work on *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*. Had I done so earlier they might never have been written.

To arrive at the essentials of a metaphysic after many years of rather blundering search, and then, a month after laying down the pen, to find that another, far better equipped and with far greater mastery, has presented already a closely parallel system worked out in detail, is at once an encouragement and a disappointment.

Yet I do not regret what I have written, nor intend to suppress it. Though the conclusions are often similar or identical, the thought is totally different, and totally uninfluenced by Gentile. It is perhaps permissible to dwell a little on this, for the plain reason that to arrive at the same result by different roads is to strengthen the conclusion, even though the method of one approach depends on high technical excellence, of the other on a rough approximation. Professor Gentile's work needs no bush; but I cannot hope the same of my own: therefore a brief statement of it may be pardoned.

A main conclusion of the present work is that you cannot find Reality in Being, neither can you find it in Becoming. The only thing that *is* is Personality, yet personality never simply *is*, but always is *becoming*. And pure Becoming is as unreal as pure Being. Being is substantiated in Becoming:

Becoming is substantiated in Being. Reality is thus the process of a Being which without process would not be. You cannot conceive of Personality, either of God or man, as transcendent or as immanent: the two are inseparable correlatives, which together make up Reality. Thus an essential factor of Reality is relation, without which neither Being nor Becoming could exist.

So stated, *mutatis mutandis* this is almost exactly the theory of Gentile, as I understand it. In his own words "An idealistic conception aims at conceiving the absolute, the whole, as an idea, and is therefore intrinsically absolute idealism. But absolute it cannot be unless the idea coincides with the act of knowing it, because...were the idea not the act itself through which it is known, it would leave something outside itself, and the idealism would then no longer be absolute" (*op. cit.* trs. Wildon Carr, p. 254). But, to my shame, I had read no word of Gentile; knew no more than the existence of his work; until I had completed these lectures a month ago.

The germ of my own theory will be found in *Evolution and the Need of Atonement* (1912), in the doctrine there stated of the freedom of Personality and its identity in God and man, making interpenetration possible. The problems of Immanence and Transcendence, and of the nature of Personality, are considerably developed in *Evolution and Spiritual Life* and *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity* (1915, 1918), stress being there laid upon the experience of inter-

penetration as determining the Reality of Personal Being. In *Beauty and the Beast* (1920), a book mainly concerned with Aesthetic, the connection of relation as essential to Reality is set forth, and a distinction drawn between the one-sided, or purely subject-object relation, and the reciprocal or subject-subject relation. In the latter the otherness or objectiveness of the second subject is eliminated in interpenetration, though the self-identity is retained. Finally in the present lectures[1] Reality, substantiated in reciprocal relationship, is examined, for the purpose of constructing a Theory of Knowledge; which theory suggests that Knowledge is essentially the process of experiencing by an ego which cannot be isolated from its experience: we cannot abstract, eliminating the ego, and the unique individuality of its every experience, and yet arrive at Reality.

The Theory of Knowledge as Pure Act was published in 1916, and only translated in 1922, so that the earlier parts of my work, which determined the later, were necessarily independent of it; and even the latest, these lectures, were so in fact. This is said with no wish to claim priority or merit: to do so would be both untrue and absurd. But to emphasise the independence seems to me justified, since it gives force to the conclusions, if not to the reasoning.

Professor Gentile's method is severely technical and exact, my own lacks these qualities;

[1] Jotted down as notes in 1920–21, written in 1922, and re-written in the present form in August 1923.

while he starts from pure Mind, I start from Mind's undeveloped beginnings in the creature; while he writes as a student of Philosophy, I write as a student of Evolution; he appeals for hearing to the expert in philosophy, I to some who, with no technical training, are interested in the philosophy of Christianity and in the concept of Progress. From this difference of standpoint results a frequent variance in detail, even though the conclusions may bear a close family resemblance, in spite of not unimportant differences. It seemed best, however, to leave my argument as it stood, recognising that in places it may prove unable to bear the stricter scrutiny of so critical a mind as that of Professor Gentile; yet at the same time to add an Appendix in which some of the arguments could be examined in the light of his work.

I cannot hope that this last is adequately done. *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act* is not easily grasped in detail, and my acquaintance with it is of so short standing that I dare not expect to escape the risk of misrepresentations, and even positive blunders. If there are such, I can only crave the writer's pardon.

I wish gratefully to acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife for preparing the Synopsis, and for other help.

S. A. McD.

WINTON.
October, 1923.

SYNOPSIS

I

LIVING AND THINKING

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These lectures aim at establishing a Theory of Knowledge based on the facts of Evolution and in sympathy with the spiritual interpretation of Nature by the best metaphysical systems 1

Inquiry into the Biblical conception of the meaning of Knowledge

(*a*) Isaiah, Hosea and Psalmist all identify knowledge with "the fear of the Lord" or with "righteousness" . 2

(*b*) Later writers, *e.g.* the author of Job, speak with a less certain voice 3

(*c*) But, when Jewish thought had recovered from the shock of the impact of Greek ideas, the old Jewish identification of knowledge with "the fear of the Lord" emerged triumphant 5

(*d*) The conception of the Immanence of God is latent in the Book of Wisdom, and also the corollary that all knowledge is of value 5

(*e*) Christ preached the doctrine that the knowledge of God is an immediate knowledge of the spirit, not an intellectual knowledge of the mind 6

And that knowledge is the living of a life . . . 6

Essentially a life lived in relation with other lives, with God and with men 7

Christ also showed the inadequacy of the old Jewish belief in a merely Transcendent God, and emphasised the fact of His Immanence 7

(*f*) St Paul laid stress on the difference between "wisdom which is foolishness" by which he meant abstract intellectual knowledge, and "wisdom unto salvation," direct immediate knowledge of God and His Will, gained by living a life in fellowship with Him 8

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The teaching of the Bible leads to the truths that *ultimate Reality is God and man in relation*, and that *Knowledge is the living of a life*, and can be summed up in the Revelation "God is Love" 10

Inquiry into the conception of the meaning of knowledge based on study of the facts of Evolution

Evolution signifies the triumph of the living organism over its determined environment and the emergence of an increasing freedom in successful organisms, . . . 12

In short, progress from the lower to the higher, . . 16

Till self-conscious man is evolved, able to control his individual destiny in considerable measure, . . . 18

And to re-act in a greater degree to the Whole Environment than any other creature as his activities become more spiritual, ... 19

Till at last he becomes conscious of Beauty, which urges him to create; 19

But different men give a very different account of Reality, when asked to explain what they mean when they say "I know" 20

There are two distinct meanings of *to know*:

(1) Knowing about things, a one-sided activity; and

(2) The mutual knowledge and understanding obtaining between two people who know each other . . . 23

And similarly two distinct meanings in which *to love* is used:

(1) To describe a one-sided activity, akin to the apprehension of beauty, and

(2) To describe mutual love 23

The above distinctions are of great importance to our theory, as is also the fact that man's judgments on the nature of Revelation are deductions from experience like his judgments on material phenomena 24

Christian doctrine includes many of the great classic antinomies of philosophy, *e.g.* Christians believe in God as Transcendent and yet Immanent, as Being and yet Becoming . 25

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It is the aim of these lectures to suggest a line of thought that may point towards the solution of some of the famous antinomies: for we shall find that Freedom expresses itself by Self-limitation, that Unity is saved from nothingness by Multiplicity, that Transcendence establishes itself perpetually in Immanence, and that Good is only good where Evil is possible 26

II

KNOWING AND LOVING

To formulate a successful theory of knowledge it is necessary clearly to define the equivocal expressions "to know" and "to love" 29

All the different uses have factors in common, they postulate a sentient being as subject, and they make a judgment on the experience of that being 31

In saying "I know" nothing definite is postulated about the thing known except that it has been in some way or other experienced by a subject 32

We can only judge of an animal's knowledge by precarious analogy 32

The scientific method seems to lead to a dilemma: *either* we must describe all reactions to environment on the part of living creatures as "response to stimulus," from the reactions of the humblest forms of life, to the complex activities of a man's thought, *or* we must say that there is "knowledge" all the way down 33

The first position is untenable if the theory of evolution be accepted, for it neglects the element of contingency, freedom or unrest in the organism, which underlies the process 34

The second position poses us with the difficulty of *who* knows in the lower stages, or what pronoun can be applied to the lower organism 34

Considerations arising from the study of knowledge of THINGS

A memory is involved 35

An image is always involved, not merely a perception . 35

A logical or theoretical process is involved including a judgment on the relations of the object known . . 36

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Nothing can be known except in its relations with the subject and with other things 37

Knowledge about things, non-reciprocal knowledge, is always directed to ends of practical utility . . . 38

The thing-in-itself does not exist for us apart from its relations, though we may speculate on its being as an isolated Real 39

When we say we know a *thing* it is the relations of the thing that we know, not itself as abstract nominative of the verb "to be" 39

Four facts emerge as we consider this type of knowledge:

1. This knowledge is of inestimable value in practical life 40

2. Knowledge acquired by the various logical processes of concept-formation, judgment and inference, acting upon a simple sensation or perception is knowledge *of* or *about* a thing, not direct contact with the thing itself . . . 40

3. Logical reasoning, dealing with generalised ideas, or concepts, must necessarily remove us from Reality as it eliminates the two essentials—the individual knower and the individual object known 41

4. Rational knowledge is directed towards acquaintance with environment, and is cast in a form that makes it easy for one individual to share his discoveries with others by the elimination of particulars in the formation of concepts and pseudo-concepts such as those of Science . . . 43

Thus Evolution advances by adaptive reaction to the environment, which with the dawn of consciousness eventually becomes knowledge of the environment . . 44

Considerations arising from the study of knowledge of another PERSON*: mutual or reciprocal knowledge* . . . 47

Reciprocal knowledge is very different in quality from one-sided knowledge of things 47

Knowledge of a man and love of him are closely related and ultimately become interchangeable terms . . . 48

Mutual knowledge between two friends depends on the revelation of each to the other, a creative act . . . 48

Perfect love implies complete interpenetration between two persons 48

Knowledge is the road to love 49

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The formation of concepts by abstracting and generalising the intuition 50

The essential difference between rational knowledge and a man's knowledge of his friend is that in the latter case you cannot eliminate subject and object, and thus lose touch with Reality, as you do in the intellectual process . . 53

The difficulties that have confronted philosophers as to Appearance and Reality may be due to man's attempt to employ an instrument, logic, evolved for practical ends, to the search for Reality 55

We may be driven to St John's conception of the close relation (even the identity) of knowledge and love . . 55

III

THE KNOWN AND THE LOVED

We have shown how unsatisfactory an instrument is Logic for the attempt to approach Reality, from its very nature and purpose, since the generalisations of Logic remove us from the individual and concrete; and we must now try to show that there is a second type of knowledge, differing fundamentally from intellectual knowledge, which yet may condition man's approach to Reality 56

The second type of knowledge is knowledge of persons and is, ultimately, Love 58

The problem of Appearance and Reality constantly confronts us as we study the two kinds of knowledge, and the possibility suggests itself that knowledge of things may lead us to Appearance, knowledge of persons to Reality; . . 58

But no relegation of matter to mere Appearance satisfies the biologist 58

We will assume that Reality is inseparable from centres of experience and thus from the living of a life, and finally from Love 59

Love is active interpenetration of two personalities without loss of self-identity 60

If two people know each other, and also love each other, they can compare their knowledge on the intellectual plane and each receive confirmation of his experience, which process affords a kind of critique 60

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This second type of knowledge is well described as "the expression of an intuition of mutual relation" . . . 61

It is throughout *immediate*, wherein it differs completely from intellectual knowledge 61

The first starting-point of *all* knowledge, the intuition, is immediate, but in order to *think about* the intuition we at once abstract and universalise it and so lose touch with Reality 62

There are two senses also in which *love* is used:

(*a*) Mutual love between two persons, and (*b*) One-sided love as when a man says he loves the sea or colour or a person who does not return his love 64

This second (*b*) is closely allied to Beauty . . . 64

The vision of Beauty proclaims man's refusal to be content with Appearance 65

A man's awareness of Beauty always issues in a creative act 65

In (*a*) mutual love we experience and know Reality in a timeless immediacy full of peace and satisfaction . . 66

In (*b*) we strive to approach Reality and are baffled . 66

One-sided love differs from Beauty only in the nature of its object 67

The truth that *to know* a person becomes eventually coincident with *to love* him emerges as we summarise our discussion 68

Both are ultimately the *living of a life*, an actual experience which, in being experienced, is, we claim, Reality itself . 69

In this essay we make the assumptions (the arguments for which are set forth elsewhere) that the Real is the manifestation of Personal Being and that the Personality of God and the Personality of man differ in degree only . . . 69

Reality, then, implies the living of a related existence . 70

God *is*, because He empties His being into becoming, perpetually denying mere self-existence 71

Arguments about God founded on logical concepts must remove us from Reality: God is not a sum of concepts but a living Person Who experiences and can be experienced . 72

God perpetually creates other beings to share His Perfect Experience 73

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But the only way in which creatures could learn truly to love their Creator, is for them to be set in a determined environment in which to achieve their own freedom, and to learn to love without compulsion 74

The problem of the nature of this environment presents itself. Is it Appearance or Reality? 74

It is the expression of the self-limitation of God . . 74

Appearance is the creation of the human intellect, as it makes concepts and reasons about them and thus abstracts from Reality, which is an experienced relation . . . 75

Evolution is the history of this developing experience . 76

The human intellect with its generalisations serves a most useful biological purpose in helping men to master their environment and to grow 78

Also it helps men to compare their experiences and so affords a critique 78

Immediate knowledge teaches us that things are only Real in process of being experienced 79

For Absolute Reality you need the direct relation of personal centres of experience in the actual process of experiencing that reciprocal relation 80

IV

REVELATION AND REALITY

The theory of knowledge developed in these lectures is based on the fact of evolution in the animal kingdom and in man 82

In the course of evolution man developed an instrument, logic, designed to help him in his struggle to master his environment 83

But the intellect, through logic, created an illusion, Appearance 83

Reality is always an *experience*, a life, and reaches its fullest height in the experience of love 84

But even love becomes an Appearance if reasoned about, since it is only Real while being experienced . . . 84

Yet the arguments of reason, and the comparisons of different individual experiences, do help to form a critique 85

PAGE

Further, the old Sophist difficulty does not trouble us, because the Reality is a *reciprocal* experience (which is conditioned ultimately by the nature of Personality, and is grounded in the Personality of God) 85

The old problem of the "thing-in-itself" disappears, for if you remove all the relations and attributes of a thing there is *nothing* left 87

Reality is an experience, not a thing, least of all a "thing-in-itself" 89

The relation of personal beings is essentially a *self-revelation*, as is also in a lesser degree the creative action of all living creatures 89

No man can know another without the other having definitely made a movement of self-revelation towards him; each must in fact reveal himself to the other, before mutual knowledge and mutual love can be established . . . 93

The self-revelation of a person who desires to be known by another, is also the movement of that person to know the other. It is the offer of love 93

God must reveal Himself before man can know Him, and conversely, man must reveal himself to God, before God can know him (in our meaning of the word) . . . 94

When we say that God revealed Himself to the prophets we mean that they sought and found Him 95

To the prophet God is first revealed in His universe and in the love and aspirations of men 96

God reveals Himself all the time to all men, and makes an offer of His love, and in so far as they go out to meet Him His purpose is fulfilled, and the self-revelation and love become mutual 96

Both God and man contribute to the environment, adding to Reality 97

Revelation is seen to be absolutely necessary to an evolutionary philosophy of religion 97

Summary of the argument and comparison of its conclusions with the teaching of Christ (in which it finds full confirmation) 98

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I

LIVING AND THINKING

> And this is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ. Jn 17. 3.

THE object of these lectures is to formulate a Theory of Knowledge which shall be consonant with the established facts of biological science, while not neglecting that spiritual interpretation of Nature which is the essential characteristic not only of revealed religion but also of the best metaphysical systems.

In order to achieve this object it is necessary first to examine the Biblical view of Knowledge, and then to consider those questions of evolution which bear upon the growing acquaintance of the animal with its environment; dealing as briefly as possible with both of these in order to devote more time to the construction of our theory. We shall finally seek to discover a place for Revelation, and, finding that the concept is actually implicit in the thought structure we have erected, we shall in this way be led back full-circle to our starting-point, the Christian idea of knowledge. Often it will not be possible to enter fully upon the more technical aspect of the matters under discussion; though I hope to have the opportunity of remedying some few omissions in print.

Yet the avoidance of some difficulty, and even some technicality, will not be possible in the second and third lectures; and with this I must ask you to bear.

In the Old Testament we find a remarkable absence of metaphysical speculation. Intellectual knowledge is at a discount. The only true knowledge is the fear of the Lord. Isaiah, in his poetical parallelism, actually identifies the spirit of knowledge with the spirit of the fear of the Lord[1], and for him perfection dawns when the earth is full of the knowledge of the Lord[2]. Earlier we find Hosea proclaiming the value and lamenting the lack of this knowledge[3]. In the Psalms not the intellectually ignorant but the workers of iniquity are said to be without knowledge[4]. It is ignorance of righteousness that brings the nation into captivity[5].

With the aid of a concordance it is easy to multiply instances.

Clearly the genius of the Jewish nation did not lie in the direction of abstract thought. Nevertheless abstract thought was at times forced on individuals and even upon the nation, though here too we find it concerned with ethico-religious problems. Speculation dawns with the great dilemma of the suffering of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked. Sheol offers no redress, for righteous and wicked alike there drift in an aimless gloom; and in this life the wicked

[1] Is. 11. 2. [2] Is. 11. 9. [3] Hos. 6. 6, 4. 1.
[4] Ps. 14. 4, 53. 4. [5] Is. 5. 13.

often prosper to the end—yea, and their children's children unto the third and fourth generation. Further examination leads some to the conclusion that there is no moral order in the Universe; God is omnipotent, but not good. This is the solution of the book of Job, though subsequent redactors have endeavoured to soften it by an appeal to a characteristic doctrine of the exilic and later writers that God is inscrutable and man cannot know His ways, but must worship in silence[1]. This doctrine amounts to intellectual agnosticism, though on the religious side it is saved by the tacit assumption that man's imperfection alone bars him out from a fuller understanding: that there is an explanation, though man cannot grasp it.

Later we begin to find the influence of Greek thought darkening, not illuminating, the problem. The Jew seems to have been no philosopher, and from Greece he borrows the least worthy elements of her thought. In Ecclesiastes we find complete scepticism, apart from some later redactions. The writer gives up the moral problem as insoluble, and adopts a Stoic attitude in a world which shows no divine government. All is vanity: sensual pleasure and the search for wisdom are alike empty. A subsequent editor goes even further and adopts a corrupt epicureanism like that of the *Rubáiyát*[2].

In the book of Wisdom some light dawns. The

[1] Cf. Is. 45. 15; Zech. 2. 13; Joel 2. 14.
[2] Cf. Siegfried, *H.D.B.*, Art. Wisdom.

influence of Plato is evident, and the writer's object is to bring the discoveries of the Greek search after knowledge to bear upon the national and moral perplexities which beset the Jew at the end of the second century B.C. The chosen race can no longer avoid the great tide of Gentile culture which is lapping on the shores of Palestine. The Jew must be able to give, to himself at least, a reason of the faith that is in him, in terms of the thought of his day. Belief in the resurrection of the dead, still uncertain and far from universal, has begun to lighten the darkness of the problem of evil, and Plato's doctrine of the soul gives further aid. But it is from the Divine Wisdom that help must come; and the writer, following the book of Proverbs, premises that Wisdom is an attribute of God; that Wisdom is readily accessible, though it is in constant conflict with an evil, earthly wisdom; and that through knowledge of the Divine Wisdom there is escape from agnosticism into the realisation that the essence of God is Love[1]. The curious, almost gnostic, dualism of Proverbs, in which Wisdom appears as a kind of Demiurge[2], or created creator, is to a great extent avoided. Rather, the concept of Wisdom seems almost to represent an attempt to formulate a doctrine of Divine Immanence; and indeed she is frequently personified.

Roughly, then, it is true to say that in the Old Testament one doctrine of knowledge alone

[1] Cf. Siegfried, *H.D.B.*, Art. Book of Wisdom.

[2] Prov. chh. 8, 9.

stands forth triumphant; that knowledge is the fear of the Lord. The goal of man is *visio Dei*. Look up the word "see" in a concordance, and you will find again and again this insistence on spiritual vision as the mark of the righteous. Prophet and Psalmist alike dwell upon it; it underlies the judgments of the Historian. At times this guiding principle is lost, and other inspiration is sought, and here we find for the most part failure. Unaided, the Jewish thinker is overwhelmed in pessimism or agnosticism; aided, he is too uncritical to weigh the ideas which he adopts and is lost in a maze of irreconcilables. Of this stage Ecclesiastes as it stands today is the notable example.

The faithful spurn the new Gentile knowledge, the faithless embrace it and the accompanying office or emolument, and desert their faith.

A cleavage results in the nation. But, as we have seen, at the last, outside the canon, something new and valuable does emerge. In the book of Wisdom a premature embryo is born. Through the dawning of the idea of Immanence the old, kingly Jahweh, and the Transcendent God find closer touch with the wayward heart of man, craving always the intimate relation we call *love*, that can only grow in the atmosphere of understanding: of real knowledge. Here is a hint of possible reconciliation between Jewish religion and Gentile thought. Knowledge may still be worship, wisdom be still *visio Dei*; yet there is something to be gained through search after

intellectual knowledge. To the seeker after wisdom the immanence of God is revealed; his voyage of discovery is worth while, for it teaches him true things, and ultimate.

In the New Testament the situation is changed. On the one hand our Lord stands out proclaiming the *visio Dei* with the immediate certainty of one who speaks with authority of what he knows; revealing truth; preaching passionately the essential heart of the old Jewish doctrine that the knowledge of God is an immediate knowledge of the spirit, not an intellectual knowledge of the mind; that the goal of man is primarily a life of relationship with God, through and in Christ Jesus. On the other hand a group of followers, architects of the church of Christ, educated men who could not ignore the secular learning of their day, write to establish the doubtful, and to guide those who were confused by the many tongues of Hellenistic and Latin doctrine, as well as to warn and correct those who fell short in the high calling wherewith they were called.

The teaching of Christ was in a large measure definitely revelation. Through the medium of a historic event in Time the Immanence of God was shown forth as concrete individual fact. Man, living in Time and Space, sees God face to face in Time and Space. He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father—the Father Immanent in His world; Love. Only in personal fellowship is this knowledge of God possible. Knowledge is the living of a life. There is no dead fact to be

known; knowledge is a perpetual becoming; it is Life, and Life is eternal. "This is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." Knowledge is thus a continuing mutual relation. By implication it is clear that knowledge is only achieved and can only be achieved in personal relation, love; and that revelation is an essential factor. And we further note that revelation is an activity, a becoming.

What, then, of the Transcendence of God? Transcendence *per se* is non-existent. Immanence too is non-existent. Because the earlier Jewish saints had concentrated on God as Transcendent they had been unable to formulate any reasoned statement of their creed, and had laid themselves open to the dangers which overwhelmed the writers of Job and Ecclesiastes as soon as they tried to find an intellectual basis of faith. So, at the other extreme, in our own day as in the day of Heracleitus, a doctrine of Pure Becoming discovers no place of rest for the weary.

Only the passionate pleading of the prophets who proclaimed the one firm truth that righteousness, the fear of the Lord, was wisdom kept the Jewish heritage from destruction. Their Transcendent God was not quite a myth, an impossible parody of the truth; but the intellectual situation was only saved by the realisation that He was active in the world, and entered into some kind of personal relation with His creatures, thus implicitly removing Himself from pure

Transcendence. There is no such Reality as Pure Being, any more than there is a Reality which is Pure Becoming. God is Love. Love is process, or Becoming. Only in Love, process, God *is*: His Being is substantiated by His Becoming: and this activity determines His Reality. A moveless, uncreative God would not be Real at all. Christ teaches this truth, that Transcendence and Immanence are inseparable correlatives. The Kingdom of Heaven is the multiplicity of life, becoming; a growing seed, a working leaven, a net drawn through the sea; because of this it is Real, a treasure in a field, a pearl of great price, a Unity substantiated in Multiplicity.

Only he that willeth to do the will of God can *know* of the teaching[1]. The old Jews were right in believing that knowledge was a life, not an intellectual exercise, but in Christ and His teaching we see *why* they were right; these make possible a reasoned faith by presenting to mankind the Godhead as a Life; as the active process of loving. This, I think, is briefly what our Lord taught about the knowledge of God; but it is important for us to remember that not teaching but revelation was the fundamental thing in His Ministry, for to this we shall return in our last lecture.

Of the apostolic writers by far the most important for our purpose is St Paul[2], for he was

[1] Jn 7. 17.

[2] St John is so clearly influenced directly or indirectly by Greek thought in his Gospel, in which practically all of

constantly brought up against the opposition of Greek thought, and perforce gave much attention to the intellectual side of Christian doctrine.

He admits that a natural knowledge of God is possible[1]. He preaches its existence to the agricultural population at Lystra[2]. But this is not the knowledge which bringeth salvation; the knowledge which gives the complete certainty of immediate experience; rather it is inferential. What St Peter calls "faith unto salvation[3]," what St Paul calls being "wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus[4]," is the essential thing; a knowledge that comes through personal contact with God, in the living of a life. Mere γνῶσις is not enough. Ἐπίγνωσις, full religious knowledge—not only a deeper comprehension of the Christian revelation in itself, but a deeper insight into its practical significance and obligations[5], is needed. Without it all is vain[6]; with it we may all attain unto the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ[7], unto all the riches of the full assurance of understanding, knowing the mystery of God, even Christ, in whom are

the teaching of his epistles is present, that one must regard his version of our Lord's words as definitely coloured; but I think there is sufficient in the other Gospels to bear out what I have said of our Lord's teaching, even though the phrases I have used are derived in part from St John.

[1] Rom. 1. 18–21. [2] Acts 14. 17. [3] 1 Peter 1. 5.
[4] 2 Tim. 3. 15. [5] Driver, *H.D.B.*, Art. Knowledge.
[6] Rom. 1. 28. [7] Eph. 4. 13.

all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden[1].

But for St Paul there is a wisdom which is foolishness, and that is abstract knowledge; the φιλοσοφία of the Greeks with which he is specially in touch when he is in Rome. Concerning it he warns the Colossians[2] and, in different phrase, Timothy[3]. In the letters from Rome it is always in his thought. True wisdom, for Paul too, is in a life that brings immediate knowledge through contact with a Personal God in Christ Jesus.

We need not stay longer over the doctrine of knowledge in the Bible. What has emerged from our survey is clear. All through, in spite of ebb and flow, and alien tides, there is shown a growing realisation that knowledge of ultimate Reality is possible, and that such knowledge is always immediate, and always wrapped up with the living of a life. The ultimate Reality is not even God, but God and man in relation: our relation to Him and His to us; a personal thing, manifested fully in Christ Jesus. But notice again that the knowledge is always and essentially dependent on a revelation. The final stage of that revelation is compressed into three words "God is Love." The revelation can therefore be expressed in language, and so used in argument, but the expression is not the thing itself, only a dead precipitate. Reality is alive, knowledge is a life. To abstract the life from Reality is to make

[1] Col. 2. 2, 3. [2] Col. 2. 8. [3] 1 Tim. 6. 20.

it cease to be real, and from this arise the dilemmas of intellectualist philosophies. Φιλοσοφία is never the same as ἐπίγνωσις. Mediate knowledge is not knowledge unto salvation.

Already, then, we begin to see a light cast upon the history of secular thought. In the Old Testament when knowledge breaks away from personal relation with God, the issue is scepticism. So it has always been with philosophy. The purely natural issue has tended always towards a scepticism of one sort or another; either naïve scepticism, or an unknowable thing-in-itself; a materialist depreciation of mind, or an idealist depreciation of matter. Today it is the turn of the ego itself to suffer discredit[1]. Philosophy has always been on the horns of the dilemma created by the co-existence of mind and matter; inclining to favour the one or the other it has always been threatened either way with an ultimate scepticism only avoided by constant watchfulness and the employment of ingenious expedients. I hope that we shall later see more of the reason of this constant difficulty, and, tracing it to its source, discover something very familiar after all; something which Christ came to earth to make clear; the very nature of Reality. False Realities innumerable have been set up, in all honesty and toil, by the knowledge which is falsely so called,

[1] E.g. Hodgson, *Time and Space*; Strong, *The Origin of Consciousness*, and, inferentially at least, Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*. Compare and contrast Gentile, *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*.

just because that knowledge has not been able to envisage the whole problem, since its premises excluded, or failed to take account of, some vital factor. Such words would be arrogant were it not that we have to support us the teaching of Christ and the response of the human heart thereto. But if, by reasoning, we reach a conclusion which receives confirmation and fuller illumination from Him, surely we Christians are justified in our conviction that we are not far from being right?

Let us turn, then, completely away from Biblical ideas and standards, and begin our own investigation. It will have a bias distinctly biological, for after all we, and all living creatures, are organisms existing in a material environment, and there is much advantage in retaining this atmosphere of familiar experience. Throughout, also, we shall base each fresh start upon human experience, even when we move away from simple biological categories.

We men dwell amid vast masses moving through inconceivable space. These masses rotate, whirl round one another, slide past each other after a fashion that can be detected and measured. Perhaps they move in other ways which cannot be detected, pursuing a smooth course which does not alter their relative grouping. Some are hot, some are cold. Bound together by an ether which cannot be detected, whose very existence can only be doubtfully inferred, they yet form a system governed with apparently absolute rigour

by laws which we can determine. Yet each of these masses is composed of similar masses on a minuter scale, governed by laws for the most part the same, and equally rigorous, which we can again determine.

As we look yet more closely, the solid masses seem to dissolve into something that is not solid. Cloud-capped towers and gorgeous palaces melt, like the baseless fabric of a vision, into electric charges, which themselves show signs of dissolving into the uncertain realm of hypothesis as ether-strains. And still the whirling systems obey fixed, man-formulated laws, behaving in fashion calculable by us; and still we sit upon our chairs, and use our pens. Who then, or what, are we? Look nearer. Upon one at least of these larger masses slide little, shapeless particles of slime whose orbit is not quite calculable. They move in the water they inhabit; sometimes we seem to see an explanation of that movement, and sometimes not. Sometimes again we see a cause of movement, but the movement is not what we expect. We see other little particles, not so shapeless, which move more rapidly, and even less calculably. We see others of all sorts and sizes and shapes, in the water, on the land, in the air, entombed as corpses in the rock, whose detailed structure leads us eventually to the idea that between them all is a genetic relation. We see animals not far removed from men. We see men like ourselves yet singularly different. We see civilisations rise and fall,

kingdoms flourish and then disappear almost as though they had never been; kingdoms of a day that passes as swiftly as the lesser day of a colony of wasps. We see men who played a part, and made a figure in their time, swept successively down by the great tide of destruction. For a while they strutted and peacocked on their stage; then yielded their little freedom to inevitable necessity, and perished. Like a colony of ants they ran about aimlessly for a little, little day. Yes, they dwindle to ants.

But, after all, the ant's activity is not aimless. It evidences the fulfilment of some need. These men too had needs. They worked, they schemed; more, they loved and hated. Yet they perished, and too often left no memorial. We can bear the perishing of Montague and Capulet, but Romeo and Juliet loved. That is unbearable. From an aimless ant-heap, the world swells to the proportions of a hideous nightmare. It is worse than Thomas Hardy's pageant presided over by a spirit of Irony, for ourselves alone seem to furnish the Chorus of the Pities.

Yet there is a beauty and a richness there. Let our view be but short enough, and we see a land of plenty through which move contented herds; where men are happy, and know love and beauty. Only by longer watching do we see the strife, the blood and tears, the endless struggle for existence, the successive inevitable failures; the extinction of worn-out individuals, and worn-out races. Yet it is *we* who watch and strive to

understand. There must be some clue in that *we*. Even as *we* could determine the causal sequences that govern matter in motion, predicting with such certainty that we dare to give to our generalisations the name of laws, so *we* can grasp genetic relations of organisms, and understand their needs and their activities. What if we watched more closely still?

We now begin to see a moving pageant of evolution, where each succeeding race outdoes those which went before in power to utilise its surroundings for its own ends. We see as its chief feature the emergence of freedom. We see the creature triumphing more and more over its environment, achieving out of determined conditions independence, and a control of its own life. And we see ourselves, freest of all, though far less free than we, in our pride, imagine; able to know these things. Yes, a new thing, freedom, has emerged.

The nightmare begins to shrink, like a pin-pricked air-balloon. Insight has made the world assume its right proportions again, and, relieved from strain and unreal illusions of horror, we are able to apply ourselves to a disciplined and calm investigation of the meaning of what we observe.

This, I take it, has been the individual experience of most of us here. With increasing knowledge came first passionate revolt. Seeing pain and evil, struggle and death, matter and blind, unpathetic law, we lost all faith and vision, and hated that which we could not amend nor

understand. Then came a sudden insight, it may be through experience of life, it may be through some religious experience or emotion, it may be through the reasonable word, spoken or written. However it came, it gave us balance again, and we grew gradually fit for a slow, dispassionate investigation.

If we are biologically inclined the first great principle that emerges from this investigation is, that while evolution is adaptation to environment, it is something more—progress from the lower to the higher. The environment is always larger than the restricted portion of it of which an individual creature, or a race, is aware. If the creature over-adapts to a limited environment, the result is in the long run fatal. Equilibrium means rigidity; some new factor in the environment comes into play; the organism is not plastic enough to respond, and its name is added to the roll of failures. Progress and continued adaptability to a widening environment are essential, for there are two opposing principles continually at work—the katabolic tendency towards the degradation of energy, and the anabolic tendency, characteristic of the living organism, to store up energy, rendering it more available for the use of the organism itself. Equilibrium spells death. Evolution is essentially progress from the lower to the higher.

And then we have to define the *higher*. This is not difficult.

The characteristic of the organism which we call the *higher* is this; that it can utilise its en-

vironment more, making it subserve ends, using it as a tool. The creature is more free, more master of its destiny, less the sport of changing currents. The higher organism is higher because it is more free. Evolution becomes the winning of freedom by the creature out of conditions that are not free—a winning evidenced at first not so much in the individual as in the race. Then as the race progresses, we see the emergence of man, able individually to control his destiny in some considerable measure; far more free, far higher, than the lowly source from which he sprang. He has drifted across the threshold of self-consciousness, and his progress now lies along other lines; his development is mental and what we call spiritual. His ends are self-ends, his activities self-activities. He still adapts himself to his environment, but his adaptation is conscious and partly spiritual.

This constitutes in brief what I have elsewhere called the Biological argument for Theism[1], for we can argue from the nature of the response to the nature of the environment. Spiritual response demands a spiritual environment, and leads us to the idea of a God. We cannot now follow out this argument in detail, but it was necessary for our present purpose that we should summarise it.

Yet we are puzzled. The problem, What is Nature? remains unsolved. That is because we have remained outside it.

Let us next, instead of Moses-like viewing the

[1] *Evolution and the Need of Atonement.*

land from a mountain-top, descend and walk among the men who toil and till, of whom, after all, we ourselves are. *We* as individual persons know these things. *We* know each other; we know, or believe we know, God. There is the puzzle of it all. It is well enough to pull out from the ruck, and to speak in Olympian calm of adaptation of organism to environment, and of the greater freedom of men. But we ourselves are organisms in an environment. We ourselves are men who work, and think, and pray. By work, we adapt ourselves to our environment, and, adapting ourselves, control it and gain more freedom of self-determination. This practical activity is simple, and in a large measure has become automatic. Our real energies are directed to gaining new and further freedom by new and further mastery over our surroundings. We develop the power of intellect, and apply the scientific method in a greater or less degree; observing; using inductive and deductive reasoning; testing conclusions by experiment.

We get to know a good deal about our environment, and that knowledge is of practical value to us. Both forms of our response to the environment, both types of adaptation, are practical; the thinking as much, really, as the acting. We shall see that this point is of some importance later.

But, as we go further, our conclusions tend to puzzle us again. They lead to a conception of the world so very different from that given by

our sense-experience. We begin to wonder which is real, the picture given by reason or the picture given by perception. We begin to think philosophically[1]. Side by side with this process of thinking goes on a process, advancing first far more rapidly than pure thought, which we may call spiritual development. We have stated that this development is a response to a spiritual element in the environment; that we can argue from the response to the environment. This plea is probably just. Actually, the environment, the hills and trees and thunderclouds and animals and fellow-men, set men wondering and dreaming. Sun and thunder, love and hate get strangely mingled. Men begin to pray to something, to aspire to something. Their pantheon is often unseemly, their cosmogony childish. Yet spirit answers to some environmental spirit, and though man finds new wrongs to do as he becomes more civilised, he finds new goods as well and a new knowledge.

Then something else dawns on him—the thrill, the wild excitement, the utter, incommunicable joy of beauty, rousing in him not peace but a great creative longing. Beauty he finds immensely

[1] No doubt the primitive philosophising of the savage is conditioned by an ignorance of natural laws rather than by detailed acquaintance with them, but his observation is so closely interwoven with theology or mythology that it is nearly true to say that genuine philosophy arises out of the study of physical laws, as it did actually in the case of the early Greek thinkers.

exciting, because it makes him want to do things, and makes him feel able to do them. Beauty makes him tower consciously above the world as a creator. It vivifies him, rouses him from vegetable inertia, awakes a divine unrest, often felt as a yearning so vivid as to be a pain. As a tool-maker he learned and triumphed physically; but here is new knowledge. For the poet knows something, the painter knows, the musician knows. Yet if you ask him what he knows, he cannot tell you. He has said it in the only way he can in the poem, the picture, or the symphony. If you cannot understand he can tell you no more.

And then again comes the man of thought, who sits down and considers. He sees the man of affairs, who knows—none better—the means of making his environment serve his ends. He sees the man of science who knows what the world is made of, and can apply his knowledge to the harnessing of forces and of matter, to serve the ends of mankind. He sees the prophet, torn with an agony, a great conflict, who knows God, and, because men will not hearken nor learn, proclaims a coming desolation; he sees him rent with doubt and pity, uplifted with a vision, a sad figure always, yet always greater than his fellows. He sees the priest, irritatingly conservative, generally in opposition to the prophet, yet tenderly ministering the hoarded spiritual knowledge of the past to millions who seem to derive comfort from the reminder of old

truths; a man genuinely desirous of conserving something that is precious, genuinely anxious lest in the new an old good shall be lost; timorously fearing to move forward, yet bold to the death in defence of the positions that have been won; often obscurantist, yet saved from stagnation by love. He sees the artist, creature of his moods, proclaiming another truth; a man of intermittent vision, now exalted, now blind, deaf and despondent, yet proclaiming something, and creating something because of what he has seen and heard. "Let others reason and welcome; 'tis we musicians know." He sees the man who loves utterly happy in his love for the little time it lasts, claiming a higher knowledge than the rest, until death ends it, yet often mistaking mere passion for love and discovering miserably his mistake. He sees Nineveh uplifted and proud, "wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand; and also much cattle." He sees Nineveh a heaving mound, and hardly a memory. He sees incalculable millions of creatures killing and being killed, grotesquely ponderous caricatures and empty dancers of a day, dainty and fragile; all striving to make their contacts serve their ends; all seeking food and escape from death; and all alike perishing. He goes by, and lo they are gone; their place can nowhere be found.

Yet he knows; and yet, too, the ass knows his master's crib, the crayfish knows his hole in the

river bank. But the man of science says that the river is hydrogen and oxygen, and that these gases are systems of electrons far distant from each other. The poet says the river is—all kinds of irreconcilable things according to his mood. The prophet sees in it a symbol of the destructive power that sweeps away evil[1]. What is the real universe that lies behind all these things? What does the crayfish know, and the man of affairs, the poet and the prophet? What do they mean when they say "we know"? What do *we* mean—for after all *we* are the human beings of the philosopher's contemplation. Still we are outside it all somehow; and still we are puzzled.

Let us take the things we know, and the ways we know them. We know objects, we know the chemist's and physicist's analysis of objects; we know people; we know God; we know beauty. We know people best by loving them and serving them; we know God best by loving Him and serving Him. In a sense we can and do say that we know beauty best by loving it; under special conditions we may even say we love an object, though we do not as a rule love a potsherd or a drilling-machine. We do not say we love a force or an electron, yet we know them. They are a part of our knowledge. Moreover we constantly love people who do not love us, and we say that God loves men who do not love Him. Yet clearly this is something different from loving people who love us.

[1] Is. 8. 5–9.

We are evidently using the same words, *know* and *love*, to denote different things. There is knowledge of people and knowledge of things; of this last scientific knowledge is a special development. There is also love of people who reciprocate that love, and there is love of things and of people that cannot or do not reciprocate that love. There is besides a more or less metaphorical usage of the terms as applied to beauty. We cannot in strict accuracy say that we know or that we love the beauty of an object, for beauty has its own characteristic appeal which is not the appeal of knowledge nor of love. This will emerge implicitly from our discussion, and we shall not elaborate the special point of metaphorical usage.

Our main concern will be to distinguish the two senses in which the term *know* is used, as knowing about, a one-sided activity, Protean in its forms, and knowing as a reciprocal activity obtaining between persons; and the two senses in which the term *love* is used, as a one-sided activity akin to the apprehension of beauty, and as a reciprocal activity obtaining between persons. In discussing knowledge and love we shall obviously have to consider what it is that is known, what it is that is loved. In other words, we shall have to spend a considerable amount of time in formulating such a distinction between Appearance and Reality as will serve the particular purpose we have in view. Whether the distinction at which we arrive will be sufficiently general

to be adopted by us as a true standard is another question, which can only be judged after we have reached it. We set out with a definite and limited objective;—the drawing of a distinction. But this objective has to serve as a base for further operations.

We believe that God reveals Himself to man, and that through this revelation man comes to know God. Because we believe this we pray, we use sacraments, we give to ourselves a reason for the faith which is in us that we shall not simply perish, but know a life after death. In a greater or less degree almost all men of every race pray, celebrate sacraments, and believe in some kind of after-life. Evolution, if not a doctrine of experience, is at least a deduction from experience, a deduction arrived at by application of the scientific method to observed phenomena. Revelation is also a deduction from experience, though the experience is largely, not wholly, spiritual[1]. Yet even spiritual experience is founded on, and claims to include, material phenomena, after all. And those to whom the practice of the presence of God is most familiar, who claim to know Him nearly, state with a striking unanimity, and with even a striking similarity of phrase however different their starting-points, that their deductions are in a sense capable of experimental test, since they can rely on that communion for help and strength and insight whenever they need it. It is easy to dismiss this

[1] Using the term as in common parlance.

as merely evidencing the similarity of human minds; easy, but stupid. You have got to account for the existence of the spiritual in man, and its development in directions often at variance with physical well-being; for the categorical imperative of ethics, and the groping of mankind after a spiritual reality; nay, for the very existence of progress, and freedom, and order; for the element of purpose in evolution; for the order of the universe; for thought itself. If, as I think, we are driven by these and by many other considerations, to believe in a Spiritual Environment or God, it is absurd to try to explain the spiritual experience of men in terms of their own mind alone. And the mystic and the saint are perfectly certain that by Revelation man comes to the knowledge of God. Yet Evolution and Revelation seem not correlative, but contradictory terms.

Finally, there is Christian doctrine. It teaches that "God so loved the world, that He gave His only Begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life." It teaches that God is so like us that in Jesus He could come to share our common experiences, to suffer, to enjoy, above all to love, and yet that He is both the Creator of the manifold universe, and the one Origin of all. It teaches that we are so like Him that we can hope to enter into that full, personal communion with Him which Jesus called Eternal Life. It teaches that in this union, made possible by the experience and love of Christ, all our sins are left behind. We Christians

believe in God as Transcendent yet Immanent, as Being yet Becoming, and in the possibility of communion on earth with Him whom yet unseen we love. And we believe this because we believe that through the ages God has revealed Himself to man, and still reveals Himself; though we believe too in a great Historic Revelation whose time and place were as definite as the time and place of Napoleon. We know, and we love Him who has revealed Himself. We believe implicitly and without reservation in a great Reality which lies changelessly behind all the changes and chances of the world of appearances. The philosopher may pose us with antinomies. There is the antinomy of Freedom and Determination. That is the background of evolution. There are the antinomies of Unity and Multiplicity, Reality and Appearance. These are the background of metaphysics. There is the antinomy of Good and Evil. That is the background of ethics and of theodicy. There is the antinomy of Transcendence and Immanence. That is the background of theology. But it is also, as Being and Becoming, the background of philosophy; ultimately inseparable from the antinomies, both of Reality and Appearance, and of Unity and Multiplicity. It is even the background of evolution, and may finally be found to coincide with the antinomy of Freedom and Determination.

The philosopher, I say, may pose him with antinomies, yet the Christian is unshaken. In Christ he has known the Father, and that know-

ledge is enough; he only waits till the Spirit guide him into all the truth. He holds it not impossible, nay even certain, that each pair of antinomies represents two sides of the same truth, both essential.

In the succeeding lectures we shall be chiefly concerned with only two of these antinomies, Reality and Appearance, Being and Becoming. Yet if we succeed in convincing ourselves that Reality could not be Reality without Appearance, because Being could not be Being without Becoming, though we may have violated a Hegelian triad, we shall really have gone far towards solving the other antinomies as well. For we shall find that Freedom expresses itself by complete Self-Limitation, that Unity is saved from nothingness by Multiplicity, that Transcendence consequently establishes itself perpetually in Immanence, that Good is only Good when Evil is possible. We shall not attempt to argue out all these problems *seriatim*, nor even to draw specific attention to the bearings of our main argument upon each, as the points unfold themselves. To do so would take much space, and would distract our attention from our main line of thought, confusing the issue. Moreover I have tried elsewhere to deal with some of them in detail, and it would mean covering a large amount of the same ground. But if, finding perhaps our argument about God and Reality and Appearance, the knowledge of God, the knowledge of Reality and the knowledge of Appearance, suggestive and

illuminating, you will think out for yourself the bearings of the argument upon the other antinomies, you will find them implicitly included in our scheme of thought, and patient of the same solution.

To *know* is life eternal; so St John reports our Lord. We dare not, cannot leave the problem of knowing alone in face of this. We cannot, indeed, from the very constitution of our human nature. We must understand what we mean when we say that life eternal is to know God, and we cannot begin to understand until we have defined the term "to know."

II

KNOWING AND LOVING

> He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him: but whoso keepeth his word, in him verily hath the love of God been perfected. 1 Jn 2. 4, 5.

In the first part of my previous lecture I pointed out that in the Hebrew and Christian tradition the ground of knowledge is always an experienced relation with God, dependent upon His revelation. Truth is accessible through this experience alone. Whatever scanty metaphysical discussion we may find proceeds always from this point of reference, unless there is an alien influence at work. Since the experience may always be refused, and this refusal is sin, the problems of being are always secondary to the problems of conduct. Knowledge is implicit in the living of a life, and the reality of that life eventually bursts upon the world after a long, slow dawning, as communion, love.

If, then, we are to find a solution of the problem we have set ourselves to investigate, our discussion must centre round these two words, *knowledge* and *love*.

Now it happens that each of them is a word whose meaning comprises an endless variety of shades; and, a matter yet more serious, each is

definitely equivocal. There are many Saxifrages, differing in specific detail, but there is also the Burnet Saxifrage, slightly resembling them in some ways, which belongs to a totally different order of flowers. So too the term *know* conveys a great variety of related ideas, but it is also used to convey an idea really far removed from these in spite of a superficial resemblance. And so it is with the term *love*.

We have embarked upon the discussion of a theory of knowledge. It is, then, essential that we should clear up these equivoques at the outset.

The present lecture will be devoted to the growing acquaintance of the creature with its environment—to the problem of Knowing; the next to the consideration of the environment itself—to the problem of What is Known. In the light of these discussions we shall be able, in the last lecture, to enter upon the problem of Revelation, where we shall find that the elimination of the equivoques has cleared the ground of some difficulties.

I know that the duck-billed platypus lays eggs. I know that I am hungry. I know that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other sides. I know that it was blue. I know a good picture when I see it. I know that the ratio between the electrostatic and electromagnetic systems of units has the dimensions of a velocity. I know that man will bore me. I know Thomas. I know that

my Redeemer liveth. What a variety of ideas is covered by this *I know*! A fact from a zoological text-book, the recognition of a bodily state, a mathematical relation in Euclidean space, a memory-judgment of colour, a general confidence of one's ability to make an aesthetic judgment, a deduction from definitions in theoretical physics, an antecedent judgment of future relationship, an assertion of personal intimacy, a religious belief commingled with a personal experience—all these are covered by the term.

Yet something quite definite is suggested by the word in every case; and there is, further, something common to all these different uses, even when we come to "I know Thomas," though this knowledge is the Burnet Saxifrage of knowing. To begin with, a sentient being, the same sentient being, is postulated throughout. It is of the experience of such-an-one that we speak, and so an experience is postulated too. Further, a judgment of that experience is involved, and that judgment is assumed to be correct.

Everything is however taken more or less at its face value. There is no serious attempt to distinguish between Reality and Appearance in the word *know*. The standpoint is not philosophical, but naïve. Concrete is not distinguished from abstract, memory from immediate experience. Even fictitious is not explicitly distinguished from real, for a man may say "of course I know Mr Micawber." Clearly we cannot look for the

common element in the final Reality of the experience described.

Our first point, then, is that in saying *I know*, nothing definite is postulated about the thing known except that it has been in some way or other experienced by a subject. It is to the experience, and to the subject of that experience, that our attention must first be directed.

Let us begin with the simple question, What do we mean when we say that the ass knows his master's crib? Unfortunately we cannot answer it. We have really no clear conception at all of what an animal's knowledge means, except by somewhat precarious analogy. All we can say is, I understand roughly what I mean by saying "I know," and since the animal manifests certain outward states which accompany recognition or what not, I assume that he knows in the same sense that I apply the term to myself. That is in fact the sum-total of our acquaintance with the matter, and for practical purposes it is good enough. But, adequate though it may be for practical purposes, it is not sufficient when we come to order our acquaintance with the universe.

To scientific method an easy way lies open. It treats the animal and the object in question as two physical entities of which the former has the peculiar quality of reacting to stimuli, the latter only of supplying them. A zoospore of the simple fresh-water plant *Ulothrix*, newly emerged, seeks moderate light. Later, an internal

chemical change takes place which causes it to shun the light. Eventually we may know what that chemical change is, and the exact effect of the light's rays. Positive phototaxis, followed by negative: the light probably upsets an enzyme-equilibrium, we airily explain; and go on to point out the advantage of this to the plant as a means of dispersal. Again, the low animal organism *Paramoecium* swarms towards dilute sulphuric acid, or even towards corrosive sublimate, which kills it; it flees light or salt. Positive and negative chemiotaxis, of course, though these particular cases appear to have no special evolutionary value. Still a paramoecium shows other reactions such as avoidance of heat and attraction to cold, which have such a value. True we now believe that the less favourable condition arouses a restlessness in the organism, which causes it, by a process of trial and error, to seek the pleasanter environment, but it comes down to stimulus and reaction still, though of a more elaborate type, involving the testing of relatively large areas, instead of a direct, immediate and inevitable response to the stimulus.

From this starting-point two courses then seem open—either to say "response to stimulus" all the way up, even to the complex activities of a man's thought when he says "I know" this or that, or to say "knowledge" all the way down, even to the phototactic and chemiotactic sensibilities of the lowest forms of life.

The first is so difficult that we incline to

question the adequacy of the scientific method, which eliminates whatever is not patient of its formulae. It may be too abstract. To accept the fact of evolution, yet take no cognisance of the element of contingency, of freedom and unrest, which makes that evolution possible, is legitimate enough for descriptive purposes, but for no deeper investigation.

The second lands us straight in the difficulty of the undefined. "Know" is meaningless without a personal pronoun; yet what personal pronoun can be applied to a paramoecium? When we ourselves say "I know" the real emphasis has shifted from the second word to the first, till this is of at least equal importance. It is in just this shift of emphasis that our difficulty lies. We are never quite sure where it falls.

The ass knows his master's crib. Why do we say it? Simply, I suppose, because the ass returns to his stable manifesting symptoms of pleasure and familiarity such as no other stable calls forth, and returns spontaneously. It might be merely a question of stimulus and reaction, but even while we suggest this we reject it as not true. We credit to the ass something of our own experience. We certainly do not believe it in our dog. He *knows*; does not merely respond to stimulus. The emphasis has begun to shift forwards to the pronoun. Emphatically we do not believe it in ourselves. But with ourselves the greatest difficulty is gone, or at least veiled. We can say "*I* know" with perfect confidence, even if

we are not fully clear how the pronoun is to be defined. We do not wish to define it. It stands for something that knows it knows, knows it recognises, knows it responds to a stimulus. Does the dog know it knows? We incline to think so. Does the ass? perhaps. Does the paramoecium? and there we stick again. What pronoun to a paramoecium? And, if none, what is pronounless knowledge? The scientific method really does not help much. We must start again, this time with ourselves.

I know. In the first place the statement involves a memory. Often this is obvious, as when I say "I know a little inn on Dartmoor where the cider is first-rate." The fact may not be true; perhaps it was merely that I was very thirsty; but the memory of the relation between myself and the cider is perfectly accurate. It seemed first-rate. Often it is not so obvious, as in "I know that is a good picture," but in fact we know it largely by a comparison of memories of all we have seen and heard and read of pictorial art. "I know" an object or a fact always involves an image, not merely a perception. Language deals wholly with images, and to *know* implies to know a thing described by language in the broadest sense of the word. We only *know*, in the sense in which we are using the term at present, something which has already been expressed and then subjected to another process. This, of course, is fundamental to Croce's philosophy. The statement "I know" premises an activity of the mind,

a logical or theoretical process. Mere perception is no more *knowledge* than is mere sensation. Unless the ass has memory-images and can express them to itself in some form of language it does not know its master's crib. The language need not be what we should ordinarily term language, yet if the ass knows in any true sense he must have definite images, definitely related, and judged to be such after comparison.

Here two more points emerge. To know involves a judgment of one sort or another, and relations. The relations are fundamental. Take any object you like, you will find that your knowledge of it is a knowledge of relation; obviously, in the first place to yourself, the knower, but also to other objects. Say, for example, that you are suddenly faced with an orange or a rhinoceros. You know them at once, and their relation to you is obvious. But we may analyse the knowledge somewhat further. I do not say "I know" of a rhinoceros at which I am looking, but I *can* say "I know a rhinoceros" when I visualise and remember certain characteristics and qualities which go to make up the image rhinoceros. Moreover, face to face with the beast I can say "I know that is a rhinoceros," basing my statement on memory-images of other live rhinoceroses or on pictures and descriptions; and these images are really compact of relations. "Tough, naked, folded skin"—this implies as compared with the fine skin, hair and feathers, smoothness, and the like of some other animals; "Living in

scrub—eating roots—long horn on the nose"—each descriptive term involves relations and comparisons.

Knowledge (that is intellectual knowledge, with which alone we are dealing at present) is always knowledge of images in relation. You cannot know a thing in absolute isolation. To say one knows an isolated fact is in truth a contradiction in terms. You cannot know *one* thing, because you know only qualities or attributes or data, and each of these is formulated in relation to and in comparison with other things. Rough implies less rough or smooth; thick implies thin; there implies here; and so on: for each there is a standard of comparison. Moreover there is yourself related to the object, in the act of knowledge if in no other way.

Here, then, when we say "I know" we mean that we construct a complex image-presentation of a certain number of the generic qualities of the object by comparison and a certain number of its determining factors in a specific case by relation. Further, the generic qualities were based on previous observation of specific relations. All through, our knowledge is checked and shaped by judgments, inferences and generalisations of various types. It is not germane to our purpose to discuss these. We need simply note that in fact we know things only because, and in so far as, they are related to us and to other objects.

The practical utility of this kind of knowledge

is vital to our discussion. To know, in the sense of the word we are at present considering, is in its essence, to be able to use some portion of the environment. Science (which is purely utilitarian, as its method shows, however indignantly the man of science may protest that he seeks knowledge for its own sake) is the attempt to acquire knowledge of phenomena and their relations which shall be as complete and as easily available as possible, that men may control their destiny more efficiently. To know more completely is to have greater control, more power to use.

In practice, the more qualities and relations of which one is cognisant the better does one know the object and the more useful is one's knowledge.

This is still true of some fact *about* an object or a particular relation or relations of the thing on which attention is concentrated. *A* knows that Charles the First's head was cut off. *B* knows the story of the Second Civil War and the tragic inevitability of its consequence; can give dates and talk intelligently of the Stuart theory of government. *B* knows far more about the execution of Charles the First than *A* does. The bare fact is nearly useless; the fact in all its relations is an object lesson to rulers and a bribe to examiners.

Now, since intellectual knowledge proceeds by relation, it follows that we cannot know a thing apart from its relations. The thing-in-itself is

hidden from us, and knowledge can never reach to it. There is an obvious reason for this.

The thing-in-itself does not in fact exist for us apart from its relations, and though we may speculate on its being as an isolated real the speculation has no more practical value than the old question, "If you had a brother, would he like cheese?"

We are still, of course, dealing only with objects of sense; it will be our business later to enquire whether a thing-in-itself, which is *not* an object of sense, and so does not exist *for us*, could yet *be* for itself, without relations or qualities; and whether, if so, we could in any way arrive at it. The problem is clearly of theoretical importance, for the objects of sense are certainly Appearances, and we must later ask whether we can know the Reality behind them, if there is one; and whether, in this case, the Reality is unrelated and without attributes or qualities.

But for the moment we simply observe that when we say we know a thing, it is the relations of that thing we know, not itself as an abstract nominative to the verb *to be*; and that this knowledge is thus simply knowledge of or about the thing.

Whether if our knowledge of its relations were complete we should know itself, is clearly a different matter. To know all about one thing would almost certainly be to know all about everything else that exists. Would such know-

ledge be still knowledge *about*; knowledge of Appearance; or would it be knowledge, direct and final, of Reality itself? You see how our questions tend to bring us back to the problem of Appearance and Reality.

Leaving this aside we see that at present four important facts emerge for us as we consider the knowledge of the organism.

First, that this knowledge about things actually is of inestimable value in practical life; that, as Bergson points out, all intellectual knowledge is in fact directed primarily to practical ends. Speculative reasoning is essentially of the same character, for it starts in the same way, and from the same observations; and we may find that its failures are due to the fact that an instrument originally designed for practical life is not a suitable one when the purpose is to grasp ultimate truth. Anyhow, the more man knows about the qualities and relations of the things around him, the more completely can he control his destiny by making his environment a tool to subserve his ends. Now that electrons obey his will the suburban clerk can stay in bed an extra half-hour and yet be in the city by nine. Knowledge of Reality has at first sight no such urgent, direct and practical importance.

The second fact that emerges is this, that the knowledge acquired by the various logical processes of concept-formation, judgment and inference, acting upon a simple sensation or perception or awareness, is knowledge *of or about* a

thing, not direct contact with the thing itself. We know the thing in relation to ourselves and to other things; we do not bother about its essential being. As we have noticed, such knowledge must clearly be functional. Itself is not the object, nor you; it is a useful awareness of one or more relations between you and the object (which awareness itself constitutes a fresh relation, and as a matter of fact, a vitally important one). This functional knowledge is unconcerned with any immediate question of Appearance or Reality, other than the practical question of hallucination *versus* fact. And for normal people the practical problem of distinguishing fact from error is not as a rule difficult, however puzzling it may be in theoretical psychology. Empirically, or by reference to other empirically achieved ideas, or sometimes by reference to another standard of knowledge, we readily decide whether a phenomenon is fact or hallucination. But in passing we may note that in the very existence of the problem of Appearance and Reality, and even of hallucination, we do pay tacit homage to some final standard or method of knowing.

Thirdly we note that Reason, the instrument of the kind of knowing with which we are at present concerned, aims at universality, taking us away from the actual thing known, and from the actual knower. This fact is of such vital importance that at the risk of becoming slightly technical we must briefly explain the statement. The first thing which we do when we begin to

reason is to form concepts or abstract ideas. For instance, we see evidences of secular developmental change as we examine the animal kingdom, and we form the concept Evolution, which is perfectly abstract in that it contains nothing reminiscent of an individual organism, or any number of organisms, or any observer. Generally this process is not carried so far. We may speak of the concept Table, but though it does not refer to any particular table, yet it is definitely representative and does refer to a number of tables, though an indefinite number; the concept is not purely abstract; it is a pseudo-concept.

The important thing is that, to give Reason untrammelled range, we demand as a first step the elimination of the personal (subjective) and the particular (objective or representative) element in our knowledge.

This can only be done by a process of abstraction which removes us at once from the actual; but the deductions and applications of reasoning based on concepts are yet approximately correct as far as they go, as is shown when they begin again to be utilised or applied practically. After all the coordinates of practical men (to borrow a mathematical term made familiar to most by Einstein's work) are very much the same. The question whether such intellectual knowledge is correct for people with such abnormal coordinates as those of philosophers and religious folk, whether it is absolutely true or only relatively so, brings us again to the problem of

Appearance and Reality. Anyhow, what we actually do in generalising or universalising in order to acquire intellectual or rational knowledge, is to neglect the Appearance given by an individual object to an individual observer in favour of what a generalised Appearance might be to a generalised observer who was rational and nothing more—a being not merely unknown, but actually inconceivable except as an abstraction.

Thus we are led to expect such knowledge to remove us from Reality, rather than bring us into contact with it, since it eliminates two essentials, the individual subject and the individual object.

Fourthly, we observe that rational knowledge is, for a practical purpose, directed towards acquaintance with environment, and this from the very start. Thinkers eliminate the individual subject and object because by so doing they can communicate their discoveries to others intelligibly and in a way that makes it possible for them to be applied by others to similar individual objects.

Let us digress for a moment to look again at this acquaintance with environment as it develops. Every planet, every stone, influences every other planet and every other stone, only they do not know it. But, known or not, the electrical charge aggregates, or ether-knots, or whatever we may determine to call them, which we name planets and stones, do produce ether-

strains or whatever we may determine to call them which mutually modify each other. Associated with one type of ether-knot, or charge-aggregate, groups, which we call living matter, there is a power of adjustment and response far in excess of such power in other matter.

Moreover this power of adjustment is spontaneous, and capable of progressive development. In some way the living matter becomes aware of it and adjusts in a more complete or more varied or more rapid manner. Instead of a stimulus producing a direct effect the organism as a whole reacts in such a way as to manifest a certain awareness of a special feature in its environment. Moreover it reacts so as to utilise that feature, if it is useful, or to utilise some other portion of its environment, of which it is simultaneously aware (directly or by a memory-image), so as to avoid the first if it be harmful. The environment is used as a means to an individual end. Not at first a developed self-end, it is true, for the organism does not seem to be conscious of a self, but a life-end, as if life, or this special molecular pattern which manifests it, had a value and purpose. The organism thus modifies its environment by making a tool of it, and so creates a fresh environmental factor for other organisms. Later, it learns to modify it before using it. The knowledge of a relation between an organism with needs and an environment capable of supplying them, is developing.

Then comes self-consciousness, and the con-

sciousness of self-ends subservable by the environment—a dawning knowledge. The environment now becomes an object of study for the purpose of seeing how it can best be modified and selected for these self-ends; and here begins what we properly term knowledge. Yet we notice that it is continuous with mere awareness of environment. The difference lies in the fact that this is now studied in recognised relation to the recognised ends of a recognised self, whereas at first there was merely *existent* relation between organism and environment and an *existent* end, the preservation and advance of life. Obviously the person, for such we may now term him, will begin to attempt a detailed survey of the environment, in order to be forearmed for any vicissitude that may afford opportunity or menace. He will begin to enquire into the relations of life to environment; to seek knowledge of what each really is, and of their origins. And this knowledge must sooner or later lead to its own questioning, for out of it arises understanding of Appearance as different from Reality. Studying the lower creatures, man sees the mechanism of their life in differential solubility, enzyme reactions, colloid states, surface tension, osmosis, photosynthetic utilisation of energy, and a host of other physico-chemical phenomena; but he also sees an underlying something which makes for the anabolic as against the katabolic process, for progressive change as against equilibrium. The animal or plant builds up its energy content,

to utilise it in controlling its life-conditions. In winning dominion over its environment it becomes progressively more master of its fate, more free. Each stimulus upsets its equilibrium, but it meets the stimulus by adaptive reaction, which is the key of evolution, and this adaptive reaction becomes conscious, grows to knowledge, furnishes the observer's own foundation of rational thought. Knowledge is not mere reaction to environment, it is conscious self-determination.

Clearly our fourth point, that knowledge is acquaintance with environment, leads us back to the first point, that intellectual knowledge is primarily directed to practical ends, and has a practical value.

Before proceeding further, let us re-state concisely the method of this intellectual knowledge. First comes the complex process of perception. From that perception we eliminate the percipient and the individual object and so form a pseudo-concept or a concept. Reason is the faculty of concepts, and by deduction and induction we are enabled to form systems of ideas. In the perfect system the final idea is all-inclusive, and the whole becomes a multiplicity in unity. Most thinkers, from Socrates downwards, have failed to distinguish pseudo-concepts, or classes of things, from pure concepts which are free from any idea of multiplicity or number, and science has mainly dealt with pseudo-concepts, though in the doctrine of the ether we come near to a pure concept.

Essential to the whole process of reasoning,

then, is the attempt to universalise by forming concepts through the elimination of particulars.

Now let us turn to another kind of knowing. Thus far we have spoken of man's knowledge of such things as oranges and rhinoceroses and planets. What about his knowledge of other men? What about "I know Thomas"? Quite clearly this knowledge has as a rule a different quality. "I know" *may* at least contain a good deal more when it is used of a person than when it is used of a thing. Not only may it contain more, but it may also contain something totally different. In fact "I know Thomas" may connote one or other of two distinct ideas.

Thomas might conceivably be a simple object. If someone told you that Thomas was a hugely fat man with a red beard who habitually wore a straw hat with an orange hat-band and a loud check suit, and lived in Park Lane, and you had seen such a person entering a house in Park Lane, you might probably exclaim "I know Thomas," meaning that you knew him in the same way that you knew a mandrill or a lump of quartz.

But generally "I know Thomas" carries with it the implication "Thomas knows me." It differs from "I know the table" because it involves a conscious reciprocal relation; knowledge on both sides. You know a man in this way; you know a dog in this way, though less fully; you do not know a paramoecium thus, still less a planet.

Yet further, knowing Thomas implies a certain sympathy. We only know truly the people we like; we know best the people we love most. We cannot say "I know Thomas" without passing over into another concept, that of Love.

Again, and this is important for later reference, this reciprocal relation is dependent on each revealing himself to the other, which is a creative act. The relationship is not there to start with, though its possibility is. Itself is created by mutual self-revealing. This process, further, modifies the persons themselves. The influence of close friendship on character is familiar to all. Personality is creative, and its reality is established in the creative process of forming reciprocal relations. It is defined as the capacity for, or the energising power of, the relation called "fellowship." And its creative power depends wholly on self-revelation, whatever this may mean. What it does mean we shall discuss later.

If then this relationship touches one or two points of character only we call it "acquaintance." Where it touches many points we call it "love," and even at this stage of our examination it is necessary to consider briefly the characteristics of love.

Essentially love is interpenetration. *A* can take *B*'s standpoint, and *B* *A*'s, without destroying the *A*-ness of *A* or the *B*-ness of *B*. In perfect love one conceives the interpenetration as made complete without any loss, but rather with intensification, of self-identity. Love is active,

finding itself in self-loss. We like to yield our will for the sake of the other. Love understands wholly, not merely what is spoken or otherwise signified, but what is not spoken. It can infer with accuracy; comprehend thoughts and feelings that are not uttered; because it can place itself at the other's standpoint. It is happy and at rest when it is really love—that is, a completely reciprocal relation. In so far as it is uneasy and yearning, it is so because the relation is not completely reciprocal.

If, then, the accepted principle of looking to the end for explanation of the beginning is sound, we shall have to look on knowing a person in the light of, and as a stage on the road to, loving him; taking *aimer c'est tout comprendre* as more expressive when reversed *tout comprendre c'est aimer*; and this must needs colour our whole discussion.

You cannot love a planet in any real sense; you can love a human being. You can know *about* a planet, or a human being. But if knowing and loving a human being are really stages, or aspects, of one process, there must be an essential difference in the content of the word *know* as used of a man and of a planet. Thomas is something more than an object. Of this we have already seen an indication in the fact that you can only know the relations of an object, and not the object itself. The old problem of the thing-in-itself is really an indication of the inadequacy of rational knowledge.

In using this word *rational* we come to grips with the central question of our discussion.

If there are indeed two kinds of knowledge, and one is rational, what is the other? In order to suggest an answer we must analyse both more carefully.

Croce has stated that the first step in the process of knowledge is what he calls an "intuition," but he goes on to say that this intuition is simultaneously, and as an essential part of itself, expressed. Intuition is thus not a simple thing, but involves a process of formulation; and it leads on to conception. It is a true *activity* of the mind. Based on mere reaction to stimulus, built on simple sensation or perception, it is more than these, for it is aware of them, apprehends them, or, in Croce's more comprehensive terminology, expresses them. Whether any simple sensation even is wholly unexpressed, whether the paramoecium, for example, is actually unaware of any trace of sensation, is open to doubt. As we remarked before, what pronoun to a paramoecium? We do not know the dimensions of its awareness. Still, as Jennings' work shows, the response of the paramoecium is rather by trial and error than by a simple tropism, and this would seem to imply a qualitative difference between the action of unorganised matter and of an organism when exposed to external stimulus. The difference can be stated in many ways, but perhaps the most illuminating is to note that though the final result may be predetermined there is an apparent ele-

ment of contingency in the process by which it is reached. The make-up and past history of the paramoecium do come in.

The paramoecium near the drop of acid adopts the method of trial and error, bumping itself against less congenial conditions and turning back. The stone hit by another moves along a path calculable at every point. Even the drop of chloroform which, amoeba-like, engulfs a fragment of glass coated with shellac, consumes the shellac, and ejects the glass, does so with calculable certainty throughout.

Probably there is a rudiment of awareness, or better of expression, in all life, and with it enters the element of contingency which differentiates living matter from dead. Probably there is knowledge, and if knowledge, some pronoun. And here we must leave the paramoecium, with a pious expression of belief that it has some measure of knowledge, does in some small degree express some intuition to itself.

But an intuition serves, we have seen, as a basis for another process, the rational or intellectual. Let us note again that what is known in the first movement of knowledge is not an object but an object as related to the knower, and, in due time, to other objects. Not the object but the object-in-relation is known. Then comes the intellectual process of conception and its logical derivatives.

Here the centre of interest has shifted. No longer the relations as defining the object, but

the object as determining the relations holds the field, yet not really the object itself, but a universalised, abstract object which is neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good red-herring[1].

The really important thing is that the intuition on which the concept is based is an intuition of relations, not of the thing-in-itself; the concept generalises those relations. If we are strict followers of Croce we should say that it universalises them. Having done so, theory has finished with them. They cannot be expressed[2], though they are founded on expression. Expressed, they cease to be universal, that is, to be concepts. This is to say that though their entry into practical life is indeed an affair of the greatest importance, its importance is purely practical. The domain of practical activity exists because knowledge exists first as a directing force; that is, the practical is based on the theoretic. Yet it seems that in a final sense the theoretic is based on the practical —on the historic fact of the happening which led

[1] The principle of causality or else of ground really regulates the course of thought. Practically, this is of great value—and the purpose of intellect is a practical one—theoretically it leads to an impasse, because you cannot know an object through its relations; you can never isolate the object from its relations, and therefore your attempt to know the object as defining the relations is bound ultimately to fail. We need not now follow Croce far through his double degree twice repeated. There is the theoretical and there is the practical. The practical cannot exist without the theoretical, nor can the concept exist without the intuition.

[2] Croce, *Aesthetic*, chap. v.

to the intuition. The man sees the chaff fly to the rubbed amber; he investigates the unknown force, forming concept after concept in the process, and at length is able to utilise electricity. The intuition may be aesthetic; that is no doubt a very vital truth; but the organism does intuit and does as a result of it adapt to its environment. And, in order to do so, it eliminates the percipient and the object of perception, abstracting the relations from the related objects, and on the basis of these abstract relations raises its logical superstructure, for the very practical reason that the more we know about relations of bloodless abstract entities, the more nearly can we prophesy the relations of concrete entities which we can use to further our adaptive ends.

The process of abstraction may be imperfect. Pseudo-concepts rank as concepts often enough. But the tendency is towards greater universality, and this process of universalising man calls "knowledge," and wonders that it leaves him unsatisfied, issuing in a more or less veiled scepticism. The spectre of the thing-in-itself has been exorcised often enough, but it still haunts the earth.

But when I say "I know Thomas," Thomas refuses to be eliminated, abstracted, or universalised. Here you simply cannot eliminate subject and object. Thomas cannot be universalised: Mankind may be, but not Thomas. Knowing Thomas may help me to know mankind. I may eliminate Thomas in this theoretical activity of the pursuit of knowledge of men. But it has

nothing to do with the statement "I know Thomas." That knowledge is *sui generis*, unique. Evidently, I do not try to eliminate Thomas or myself when I say "I know Thomas." I do not even *try* to universalise either.

There is then a knowledge of individual people, yes, and of individual things too, which differs from rational knowledge in that it eliminates neither the percipient nor the object-in-itself; in that it does not seek to universalise. The question is now, What is this knowledge? Is it knowledge in any real sense? And of what is it knowledge? We ask again, What do I really mean when I say "I know Thomas," and how do I know him? Does knowing Thomas lead on anywhere—to a further, real knowledge? Is there a knowing which is not an intellectual process; a knowing which leads us on from the individual person to Reality? If there is, how can we escape the Sophist error? Surely a knowledge that is individual and not general must still issue in scepticism, as it did in Greece, for it would appear to be susceptible of no critique.

And yet there seems to be some kind of hidden clue in this equivocal word *know*, which we use indiscriminately of a consciously reciprocal relation between men and men and a one-sided relation, so far as consciousness is concerned, between men and objects. When we further are driven to note that the word *love* is used in a similarly equivocal manner, sometimes of a strawberry or an old armchair, sometimes of a

reciprocal relation between persons, we shall be still more inclined to ask ourselves whether the source of all our difficulties is not the inescapable yet unjustifiable tendency of the human mind to apply an instrument, logic, designed for a particular practical purpose to which it is admirably suited, to the purpose of acquaintance with Reality; a purpose for which it is totally unsuited from the very nature of the first process of logic, the formation of concepts by universalising. If this be so, we shall be driven to construct another instrument of knowledge, not open to this objection, a method that does not exclude the individual and particular, in its unique relations. Such an instrument may bring us nearer to St John's conception that you cannot know and yet act evilly, and to his conception that knowledge and love are interchangeable terms. "He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him: but whoso keepeth his word, in him verily hath the love of God been perfected." It is a curious conception, is it not? For if the method[1] of the first kind of knowledge is logic, the method of the second kind is love.

[1] This statement really introduces a very important point. We here talk of love as the method of knowledge; elsewhere we speak of it as the essential experience of personal Being, which experience is, when being experienced, Reality. Consequently we note that here again knowledge of our second type is identical with love, since method is the thing in *process* viewed objectively (*v. infra*).

III

THE KNOWN AND THE LOVED

> Now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I have been (*or*, I am) known. 1 Cor. 13. 12.

In our last lecture we studied the nature and purpose of intellectual knowledge, observing here and there a hint, no more, of the existence of some other norm of knowing.

The *nature* of intellectual knowledge was seen to lie in the generalisation of a perception, by a process of elimination and abstraction, as a first step towards the concept-formation upon which all such knowledge is founded.

The *purpose* of intellectual knowledge we held to be the expansion of man's acquaintance with the environment in order that his control over that environment might be more complete; a view which we justified by the analogy of the determinant of evolutionary progress in the animal kingdom, and the evident continuity of the life of man with that of the lower organism.

It is perfectly true that for the last two and a half millennia, and probably far longer, man has applied the same *organum* to another investigation—that of the nature of Reality—without so directly utilitarian an object (although a utilitarian

element is clearly perceptible), but we questioned whether the *organum* was really suited to such an investigation; whether the speculative method of applying it, the only possible method in this case, was likely to lead to adequate knowledge. We suggested that the process of abstraction and elimination vitiated it at the source.

The consideration of this question, and the formulation of another theory of Reality will occupy us now; and we shall be specially concerned with the hint, thrown out at the end of the last lecture, that in knowing a person we are concerned with a second type of knowledge differing fundamentally from intellectual knowledge. I would warn you at the outset that we shall be on somewhat unfamiliar ground; but the doctrine of Relativity has shown that the intellectualist foundations of science even are but a shifting quicksand, since it is no longer possible for theory to neglect the individual conditions of any observation. Therefore, though the ground be unfamiliar, the method an attempt to escape from formal logic, the argument confused by the fact that language (though in itself aesthetic if Croce be right) has so long been dedicated to the formulation of logical argument that it has become polarised in this direction, I ask you to take the plunge, and strain language to this unaccustomed use.

Since it was in considering the knowledge gained by one person of another person that the conception of a second kind of knowledge came

most clearly to us, we will start with an analysis of this knowledge.

We have found two methods of knowledge, and two only, the one concerned with the physical environment and with concepts derived originally from this, called Logic, the other concerned with persons, called Love. We have been constantly brought up against the problem of Appearance and Reality, and we are shortly to discuss it; but, finding these two methods of knowledge, the possibility immediately suggests itself that one knowledge is somehow concerned with Appearance, the other with Reality.

At first sight the antecedent improbability of such a solution seems great, for so far as our examination has yet carried us the two seem only to differ in the nature of their objects, one being concerned with matter, the other with persons. Are we going to say that Personality is Real, Matter Appearance? That solution does not, perhaps, very materially differ from that of the idealists; their systems are more abstract and bloodless, but they belong to the same class. Yet somehow no relegation of matter to mere Appearance satisfies the biologist. Clearly we must make a far closer investigation both of these two methods of knowing and of the objects known before we can reach any decision.

Grasping the nettle, we proceed to adopt that essential, unlimited characteristic of personality by which it is best defined, the δύναμις of κοινωνία, the capacity for fellowship, to borrow

once more Canon Richmond's terminology, as an inexpugnable factor in the Real, and to see whither this assumption leads us.

At the outset let us be quite clear what we are doing. We are taking as our test of absolute Reality the presence of conscious reciprocal relation, which ultimately, in its pure form, means Love. That is to say our test is experiential and in a sense pragmatic. Reality for us is to be inseparable from the experience of centres of experience, inseparable from the living of life.

Therefore we shall have to show that Love is an all-inclusive and complete activity. And further we must be prepared to face the corollary that intellectual knowledge, which abstracts the individuality from every experience in its first movement, cannot bring us to Reality, but, at most, to Appearance; and that therefore we must find in Reality an explanation of the paradox of Appearance.

Finally we must face the risk of the final shipwreck of the Sophist, who by starting from individual experience, as we are starting, ended in utter scepticism; face the risk and seek a way of escape.

We have already identified our second type of knowledge with Love. Let us study it more closely.

A and *B* love each other perfectly, or as perfectly as is possible for limited human beings. This means that *A* can place himself at the standpoint of *B* and *vice versa*, without either losing

his unique personality. The *A*-ness of *A* and the *B*-ness of *B* are not absorbed in the reciprocal relation. There is interpenetration without loss of self-identity. This is Love. Further, the interpenetration is not passive but active. It is a mutual self-revelation and a constant creation. This must be borne in mind, for it is of fundamental importance, and we shall return to it.

Now since *A* loves *B*, and *B*, *A*; *A* knows *B*, and *B*, *A*. Here we have, in some sort, an independent test of the reality of their experience, for *A* knows himself, *B* knows him, and *A* and *B* can compare their knowledge on the intellectual plane.

Of course it is possible to deny the validity of any experience, and to say that *A*'s relations with *B*, even in the comparison of experiences, are purely illusory. No answer is possible if a man deny the reality of all experience; he simply makes the universe and himself meaningless, and nothing can stop his doing so. But no man in practice does treat all experience as illusory, and you can only point out to him that though he chooses to *think* differently from ordinary people, yet he does *act*, or *live*, in the same way as they do.

The one thing of which all men are immediately certain is that they exist. "I am I" is an incontrovertible truth, and nothing will shake our belief in it. The lunatic may say "I am Napoleon," but he still begins with the definite fact "I." We stand in relation to others who admit our claim

to self-existence. We stand in relation to our environment and can by our creative activity react to it, and in a measure control it. Our existence is, in a word, substantiated in our experience, which is an experience of relation; and that existence is for us Real. It seems to us to be proved real by our relation to others. Its realness does for us consist actually in the fact that *A* experiences relations with an experient *B*, and in a one-sided degree with an object *C*. *A* is quite certain that *B* is real, because of the reciprocal relations which can be compared; which are similar in content but for the difference of standpoint; and which, as love grows deeper, wider, and more interpenetrating, become more and more nearly identical in content, though there is no confusion of self-identity.

Knowledge here becomes the further verification of this Reality through fuller love; since, and in so far as, it is reciprocal, it is identical with Love.

But it is not intellectual knowledge. It is the expression of an intuition of mutual relation; immediate knowledge; but in itself it is not a concept, nor does it lead to concept-formation. What in its first movement is intuition grows to be love. We may here note, prematurely, that knowledge of Reality is characterised by immediacy, and thus differs completely from intellectual knowledge.

We must next notice another characteristic. This immediate knowledge, this love, never proceeds from *one* self alone.

We have said that it is creative; that besides expressing the intuition in internal knowledge it expresses it outwardly, creating the very relationship which it knows and which makes it Real, and continually moving towards fuller relationship and wider knowledge. But if *A* is doing this, *B* is doing it too. *A* cannot know or love *B*, in a strict sense, without *B*'s consent and reciprocal activity.

We observe, then, that this knowledge is direct or immediate, and that the method of this knowledge is Love; that is to say the living which makes Reality is Love. But we are conscious of the love, and this consciousness is our immediate knowledge. Of course if we, so to speak, stand away and survey our love, and reason about it, making Love a concept, we at once remove ourselves from its Reality[1]. We abstract, eliminating the very immediacy of experience which made it Real, and, as reasoned about, it becomes Appearance[2].

But we note next that the starting-point of *all* knowledge is immediate. For convenience we may use Croce's terminology, and say that the first moment of knowledge is the intuition, which is inextricably and inseparably interwoven with

[1] Cf. Gentile, *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, ch. XVII *et passim*.

[2] If, while we stand aside, we yet realise that here, in love, is something real, and feel that real as related to and affecting ourself, love thus partially objectivised may become something closely allied to beauty, and perhaps be identical with it. I incline to think that it is true to say that to stand aside, and see love *as* love, is to see beauty, cf. Appendix A.

expression, what is intuited being in the very intuition expressed; but this terminology is not essential. What is essential is to keep in mind that in order to think about the intuition we proceed to eliminate, abstract and universalise it, and so change it, really, out of all recognition by robbing it of its immediacy.

Now the student of Croce will remember his great contribution to thought, that the first movement of knowledge, the expression of an intuition, is aesthetic.

It is important for our present purpose not to forget that the origin or first movement of even intellectual knowledge is thus immediate, for I am going to maintain that only immediate knowledge is in touch with Reality. As you abstract, in the logical or intellectual activity, you lose touch with Reality and are left only with Appearance.

Let me repeat. The foundation on which the great superstructure of Logic is reared is the experienced intuition, expressed to the self in that experience. In logic we neglect the experience and isolate the intuition from it. But in fact the intuition is not isolated from the experience; the two are inextricably intertwined as the *process of experiencing*, though in the very first step of concept-formation we ignore this nexus. The organism which simply is aware and reacts is actually nearer Reality than the thinker, though it is less practically capable of adaptation to environment.

Now, as we have stated, *love* is used in a second sense; you can say you love a person who does not love you; you can say you love strawberries, or beauty, or bright colours. In order to come to grips with this equivoque, for the word here connotes something quite different from the meaning we have hitherto assigned to it, we must spend a little time in the consideration of aesthetic.

Croce has shown that the first movement of knowledge is aesthetic. Beauty is the expression of the intuition, and, as I have tried to show elsewhere[1], this intuition is an intuition of relation—really, of relation between existent entities; which experienced relation, in being experienced, together with the entities related, constitutes Reality.

But, that Beauty may be found, it is necessary that the entities be of such a kind, and related in such a way, that the intuition is one-sided; there must be a percipient and an object which does not reciprocate. If there is intuition on both sides, the relation created by the reciprocal intuitions which relate the two experients is Love[2].

Beauty and Love are then both creations of the active living of the experient; dependent, however, upon an object which is experienced. The one is individual, personal, not to be shared, though it may be proclaimed and communicated

[1] *Beauty and the Beast.* [2] *Ibid.*

in the practical activity of the poet, the painter, the musician; the other equally individual and personal, yet in some degree shared in the act of interpenetration, and ultimately capable of being shared completely.

Now what is known in Beauty is not Reality: indeed Beauty knows nothing—hence its varying standards and difficulty of definition. What is intuited in aesthetic expression is, as I have argued elsewhere[1], that there is something to be known behind the Appearance.

The vision of Beauty proclaims man's refusal to be content with Appearance; his blind feeling after Reality. The self is known as Real; the object is intuited immediately as somehow and in some degree Real, but is only *known*, intellectually, as Appearance; and the two kinds of knowledge produce a mental uneasiness or conflict because they appear incommensurable. Hence in part the yearning. Hence in part the artistic effort to create, in vindication of the greater reality of the self above that of the Appearance of which it is aware. The other, and the major part, springs from the nature of that Reality, and the one-sidedness of the relation with things of which we are conscious.

In seeing Beauty we see something beyond the Appearance. Yet that something is not yet an absolute Reality which we know. We strive to know; we yearn to understand just because we are unsatisfied and aware of a Reality which we

[1] *Beauty and the Beast.*

cannot grasp; and this unsatisfaction manifests itself in some creative act whose origin lies in the aesthetic impulse. In this act we may set down what we have seen, in some artistic presentation, or we may simply modify our conduct for the time. Anyhow the perception of Beauty affects our mode of living. Always we come back to this, the living of a life. It is highly doubtful if any intuition is altogether without any external creative consequence.

Contrast for a moment this unsatisfied yearning of Beauty, with the interpenetrative activity of Love, ever approaching nearer to utter peace in activity as the love grows wider, deeper, closer. There, in Love, is Reality; not in the relation as an abstract idea, not in the persons as self-existent, but in the persons living a reciprocal relation. And this Reality we know, not by the mediate, logical process but in a timeless immediacy.

In connection with this aesthetic we must now consider what we may term one-sided love. In saying I *love* strawberries, or colour, or beauty, the word is used merely in a metaphor, to heighten effect by overstatement, and we may dismiss it. But in the old sad refrain of Heine, "She was lovable, and he loved her, but he was not lovable, and she did not love him" there is more than metaphor. When a mother loves a worthless child who does not love her there is more than metaphor in the word. *Love* here expresses an unrest, a yearning, an attempt to

provoke the desired response, which indicates that the essential of real love is absent. Such love is creative; it is an offer; but since the offer is not accepted there is none of the reciprocity which is the fundamental activity of Love, none of the rest or satisfaction, which characterises love; that rest which is no cessation of activity, but indicative of an intensified activity whose outgoings are balanced by inflowings.

This one-sided love is not distinguishable from Beauty except in the nature of its object. That object is a person—not the face nor the grace of a person, but that person's self.

If the object of a one-sided relation is regarded *qua* object, yet with that immediacy of intuition which brings us into touch with the Real (i.e. if attention is not directed to a practical, utilitarian end), we are conscious of *beauty*, whether the object be a landscape or a woman; if it be a person, regarded as a person and not as an object, we feel what is ordinarily termed *love*—love, that is, in this second, equivocal sense; the one-sided love of which we are speaking.

We see, then, that this one-sided love is akin to Beauty, differing from it only in the nature of the object. It is aesthetic, not reciprocal.

(And let me state once more my belief that the essential of aesthetic is the recognition of Reality behind Appearance.)

The immediacy of the intuition is retained; the intellectual process has not removed us wholly into the realm of Appearance.

Let us now summarise our conclusions about those two equivocal terms "to know" and "to love."

To know an *object* is primitively, and in its first movement, an aesthetic process, and the knower is here in first faint touch with Reality. But for practical purposes the knower proceeds to reasoning, and the instrument of reasoning, logic, depends on a process of abstraction which removes him from Reality, creating Appearance. Appearance is definitively associated with logic.

To know a *person* becomes eventually coincident with to love him: the terms, *sensu stricto*, are ultimately interchangeable.

To love an *object*—and that object can only be said to be loved, except in a metaphor, when it is a person—is based on the same primitive aesthetic process as is to know an object. It is carried further, just as Beauty implies a going further of the simple aesthetic process. The appreciation of Beauty is brought about by the retention of the contact with Reality in the consciousness, while that Reality itself continues to evade the knower. With one-sided love we have exactly the same thing, only it is more poignant because of the nature of the object. That object is a person, and a person is Real to us, because of our own personality, yet here we cannot get into touch with that Reality.

Finally to love a *person*, which is eventually identical with to know that person, is a perfect, that is to say a reciprocal, activity. It is the living

of a life. As a relation being lived it is, we have claimed, Reality itself.

Having cleared up these equivoques we are now ready to analyse the nature of Appearance, to seek the explanation of its existence, and to justify our definition of Reality.

Now if Love be the experience of Reality, Reality itself being κοινωνία, fellowship, interpenetration, in process of being experienced by personal beings, we must obviously consider the meaning of the Love of God, if we are to arrive at any understanding at all of the terms we are using.

This is clear, if for no other reason, from the fact that we are taking the Real as the manifestation of Personal Being; that we are hoping to find the Ground of all in Personal Being, and, therefore, that the existence of the environment, of matter itself, and of Appearance, must be sought in this Ground[1]. It is further to be observed that I am simply assuming that the Personality of God differs from the Personality of man in degree only, not in kind. I have tried to give reasons for such an assumption very fully elsewhere[2]; it is impossible to repeat them now. Suffice it here to say that if Christ meant anything at all in His coming and His teaching, He

[1] See Appendix A for a comparison of this point of view with that of Gentile.

[2] *Evolution and the Need of Atonement; Evolution and the Spiritual Life; Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity*, passim.

meant this; that there was no natural bar between God and man; that union with God was possible, that such union meant the experience of Love, and that the actualisation of such union is Eternal Life[1].

Now I think that we may assume that God is self-existent, and is perfect relation in Himself. It is necessary to add this clause, since mere existence or being is an abstract idea, quite empty in itself, and removed far from Reality by the process of abstraction or universalising. To *be* must have a nominative, at least, and that nominative implies a *self*-existence—with the emphasis upon *self*. But a self-existence implies relation, and we have suggested that Reality comprises the living of a related existence.

Of course this is the view of which the doctrine of the Trinity is the theological statement. It is another way of saying that God is Love: not Love statically, but Love as a dynamic Life.

But He must be more than this. To postulate such Being of an isolated God is, I dare to say, a contradiction in terms, and therefore such Being cannot be Real.

This statement is paradoxical, and we must examine it.

Such a God could know Himself; He could experience a kind of internal mutuality; love Himself; but only in a very limited sense could He become. In the very act of stating His abso-

[1] See Appendix A for a comparison of this view of Eternal Life with that of Gentile.

lute self-existence as Love we deny it. For Perfect Love is directed not upon a self but upon others. True this God is His Own Other, as the doctrine of the Trinity states, but the point is that He *is* His *own* Other, and is so in a way self-centred. And the only becoming which He can experience is a Becoming that is purely self-conditioned, in the process of loving and thinking Himself, if indeed we can call this a Becoming at all. Put in one word, such a God would be Transcendent without anything to transcend.

Transcendence is a meaningless term in isolation: to acquire meaning it demands its correlative, Immanence. So too Being, even the Being of God, is a meaningless term in isolation; to acquire meaning it demands its correlative, Becoming.

What I am leading up to, is this. God could not Be, unless He were also Becoming. God Is, is a statement without meaning. God is Love, is true, because in the idea of Love is a conception containing an outwardly directed activity which involves Becoming. The idea of a God-before-Creation is empty of content. God is, because He empties His Being into Becoming, perpetually denying mere self-existence. God is Transcendent, because He is Immanent.

In the light of our definition of Reality as a relation that is being experienced, a life that is being lived, the difficulty of such a conception disappears. God is absolutely Real. If by abstraction you form the concept of Him as simply Transcendent He ceases to be Real, just as much

as if by abstraction you form the concept of Him as simply Immanent. You are now face to face with an Appearance only; not nothing, because God exists, but an Appearance which is not His Real Self. So too the concept of God as Pure Being removes Him out of Reality, just as much as the concept of Him as Pure Becoming does.

You cannot, in fact, form a concept of God that does not do this, because the method of your reasoning by its nature cuts you off from Reality. God is not a concept but a Person Who experiences. Remove either the subject or the object and Reality, which is the subject and object in relation, is hidden from you.

The Absolute, a conceptual entity which we can call Reality, a God isolated in self-sufficing splendour as the All or the Only, these are the creations of the logical process. Actually they have no existence. We arrive at these and similar imaginary ultimates because we persist in using a tool designed to codify our environment, for practical adaptive purposes, to do something for which it was never intended.

God is living Perfect Personality; that is the nearest approach we can make to a definition.

Now Personality, as we know it, is always creating; always spending itself and denying itself. Every person creates an environment for other persons; even human love is self-abnegation, self-surrender; even with men life is only found in losing it; to seek to save it is to lose, to destroy it.

So let us conceive of Perfect Personality, always denying itself as pure Being, always surrendering its very primacy, always yielding its self-sufficiency to extrinsic limitation, in an outflowing that shall cause others to share the Perfect Experience; always creatively active; and by this very denial of itself as Pure Being, in the process of Becoming manifesting Itself as the Ultimate Reality.

We have been assuming all through that Reality is personal relation in process of experience. Men never do experience perfect relation with anyone. The truer and deeper love is the closer do we approximate to the perfect relation, but at best we are very far off from it. Nevertheless imperfect relation does point to perfect; and because of this, from human personality and its relations we infer the Personality of God and its relations. And no personality can rest content, or indeed be at all, without this external activity. God, then, as Real must perpetually create other beings to share the Perfect Experience.

That there is a grave difficulty in such an idea of God I am aware, but the difficulty is for logic, not for experience. This difficulty lies in the fact that this external creation must be a limitation of God, and we have thus to explain extrinsic limitation by the intrinsic nature of God's Personality[1].

[1] See Appendix B for note on intrinsic nature and extrinsic limitation.

Now the only method by which such a God could create beings who can learn to love Him is to give them conditions in which they can learn to love freely, without any compulsion. They must win their freedom for themselves, out of conditions that are determined.

This is what we actually observe as the chief characteristic of Evolution. Adaptation, the winning of control over environment until it becomes a tool, is the predominant feature. Free, men must use their freedom as they will, accepting Love as their guide or rejecting it; seeking perfect Love in God, or rejecting Him; falling in with the purpose of His creation, or rejecting it. God's creation is the creation of an Environment; the creation of the conditions for the emergence of Love between persons, of true Life, of a new Real; and this creation is through self-limitation.

We may now ask what *is* this Environment? Is it real, for instance, or merely Appearance?[1]

First, it is clearly the expression of God's self-limitation. It expresses His immediate knowledge of Reality, and as such it is part of His activity of living. It therefore resembles the work of an artist who sets before others a presentation of his intuition; it sets before men God's intuition, and so is Beautiful. But it is also Real for God, because it is being lived by Him; though it lies on a lower plane of Reality since it is not fully being lived by men. It is, in

[1] I leave all discussion of the difficulty for metaphysics of the concept of the world as an object to Appendix A.

other words, Real as being part of a Whole, but only as related to that Whole. In isolation, it ceases to be Real.

And this brings us straight to the problem of Appearance. Is the Environment Real for man?

If we regard the part as the Whole; if we, for instance, consider matter *per se*, we are actually eliminating a vital thing, the fact that it is a part of a Whole, and this elimination leads to Appearance. As, intellectually, we go further and eliminate the individual and the particular we withdraw further yet from Reality, and the Appearance takes varying forms, depending on the exact factors which we agree to eliminate.

Chemist, physicist, biologist and speculative philosopher eliminate and abstract different factors, and the Appearance is to each of them a different thing. Appearance is the phantasmagoric construction of intellectual processes. *It cannot be known directly; you cannot have intuitions of Appearance, for the intuition involves the personal element and the actual experience which mean touch with Reality*. Pure Appearance is thus an abstract idea with no counterpart in Reality. What we call Appearance is an illusion due to the Part being regarded for a practical purpose as the Whole after being subjected to an intellectual process of examination. But the Part *itself* is none the less Real, though only as related to the Whole, which Whole is personal relation[1]. Yet, because the Part is the expression of the

[1] See Appendix A.

limitation of God's Personality, relation with it must be incomplete. Thus the Environment is Real, but yet of a lower degree of Reality than the final Reality of the experience of full personal interpenetration.

Nevertheless the whole story of evolution evidences the fact that right living, progress, is adaptation to the largest possible amount of the Environment. In man this becomes not only contact with a wide area of the physical environment, which expresses God's self-limitation, and can only give a mediate knowledge of Him[1], but also becomes direct contact with God Himself, in the absolute Reality of experienced Love, for whose sake God's creative activity functions.

Right living, then, brings relation with more and more of the Environment; but it further brings an understanding of the Environment as Real, because a part of a Whole. Man gets into relation with God, through Love understands the Love that accepts, glories in, functions through, self-limitation, and so begins to grasp the Environment, no longer as Appearance, but as Reality.

We now ask ourselves, What is the function of Appearance? In the very asking we see the foolishness of the question. Appearance is not a thing; it is the creation of our own intellect as we stand aside from process. The proper question is rather, What is the function of intellect?

[1] Obviously, however, giving an increasing knowledge about Him as the contacts grow wider in range.

First of all, it is a *faute-de-mieux*. The lower organism is simply conscious of some factor in its environment, and makes an image of it for future reference. Perception is translated or presented in a symbolic form. Recent psychology has taught us much of the prevalence of symbolism in primitive consciousness. Civilised man inherits this tendency to represent a thing by a symbol, but he agrees with his fellows about the symbol, and the symbol adopted depends on what group of men he is concerned with at the moment. The symbol of the physicist is very different from that of naïve men. Of course something is presented to perception, and that something is quite definite. Moreover, because in creatures at the same stage of development (who after all are the only ones likely to communicate much with each other) the same organs of perception have developed, that something will give in perception much the same to each.

Presumably all spider-crabs have the same kind of perception of a seaweed, though a *Pecten*, with its fringe of eyes, would probably have an image of a seaweed very different from that of a blind periwinkle.

Certainly most men have much the same idea of a table.

Next, as we have already noted more than once, similar, or identical, perceptions lead on to generalisation; class-concepts (pseudo-concepts) are formed, by eliminating the particular in a

greater or less degree, for practical convenience. The beginning of the intellectual process is reached.

And very valuable is this process to man as a practical being.

It enables him to classify and develop his acquaintance with his environment, but it also affords a common norm or standard of comparison. Intellectual knowledge becomes common knowledge. It is no longer liable to loss through the death of an individual; it is no longer insusceptible of verification.

Reason does give knowledge *about* the environment, and this is of the greatest possible importance. If it cannot give knowledge of Reality *qua* Real, it can at least save us from grave error by teaching us more and more *about* our environment.

But it can do more. By giving us knowledge *about* things and their relations, about our environment, it furnishes us with a critique of all experience. It enables us to compare, to discuss, to criticise, and to amend our very theories of Reality. Through it we are enabled to say there is one Truth, one Goodness, one ultimate Reality, though it cannot tell us what they are. By teaching us to live, however, it brings us all unwittingly into closer contact with that Reality, so that at length Reality begins to dawn on us as the actual experiencing of relations, more especially of the greatest relation of all, Love.

In evolution, which, if we consider man to be

the crown, means in the winning of personality, the intellect does indeed play a great and indispensable part. Moreover, without its power of criticism we could not determine whether we had begun to understand Reality or no, for we could not compare our discoveries, nor even communicate them, since there would be no fixed meaning in the terms we employed. The critique of experience must come from the intellect, if we are to be saved from the error of the Sophists; but it is the experience itself which gives us knowledge of Reality; knowledge which is immediate, and needs no logic; knowledge which can be discussed in abstract form, but which, as we must never forget, when so discussed, ceases to give us the Real.

And what does this immediate knowledge amount to? That no thing which we experience is Real in itself; we cannot even define it in isolation; it is only Real in relation to us while that relation is being experienced. The table is in its degree Real for the diner, its molecules for the chemist when he is analysing its wood, its electrons for the physicist when he is studying the structure of the carbon atom. But we notice that at intervals chemist and physicist also dine, and only the table itself is Real to them then.

Even so it is not an absolute Reality: the degree of Reality is conditioned by our state; by our appreciation of its relations. It is most Real to the man who sees in it a relation between himself

and God; who understands that it is a part of God's experience as well as his own, an expression of God's Love in self-limitation.

But the table remains unable to reciprocate; the environment never achieves the highest degree of Reality.

For absolute Reality you need the direct relation of two personal centres of experience, in the actual process of experiencing that reciprocal relation.

Then the mediating, limited environment vanishes, the lower degrees of Reality are absorbed into the Highest. How does St Paul put it? "Now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known." You see that St Paul seems also to take the reciprocal relation of perfect knowledge, which is perfect love, as the ultimate Reality, if we may accept the Authorised Version as representing the meaning of ἐπεγνώσθην more truly than the Revised. On a point of scholarship I have no right to hold an opinion. Yet it is not undeserving of note that the Authorised Version gives a general sense which is borne out by other passages, such as 1 Cor. 8. 3 and Gal. 4. 9.

We have now completed the heaviest portion of our work. I fear it has inevitably been difficult; difficult enough in itself to follow; more difficult beneath the surface, because we have been using the inescapable terms of Logic to

discuss what is not discoverable by the methods of Logic. We have turned back constantly to direct experience in a manner disconcerting to minds trained to eliminate the individual character of experience.

Our final lecture will move over less difficult ground. In it I propose first to remind you briefly of the main points that have emerged from our discussion, to examine the place of Revelation in our scheme, and to consider a little more fully the problem of Beauty, in connection with this; and thus we shall be led back to our opening, the Christian insistence on the living of a Life as primary and sufficient.

IV

REVELATION AND REALITY

God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son. Heb. 1. 1, 2.

That they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us: that the world may believe that thou didst send me. Jn 17. 21.

LET me begin by reminding you that our object in these lectures is to construct a Theory of Knowledge that will commend itself to us as consonant with the evolution of the animal kingdom and of man himself. We look on the Evolutionary Process as essentially a process of adaptation, without concerning ourselves with the nature of the means whereby that adaptation has been brought about. It really does not matter to us whether all be a question of the regrouping and elimination of Mendelian factors, nor whether acquired characters play their part. Whatever the mode, the result of evolution is adaptation to environment; and consequently we are able to argue in some degree from the organism to the environment.

A zoologist to whom an unknown gill-bearing organism was presented would unhesitatingly assign to it a watery provenance. So we, observing that man has developed spiritual char-

acteristics, unhesitatingly assign him to a spiritual environment, and for many reasons, into which I need not enter now, we conclude that this environment is not merely created by himself, but is prior and external.

This process of adaptation we saw to be essentially a growing knowledge about the environment; at first unconscious (as we call it because of the uncertainty of the pronoun to a simple organism); finally becoming fully conscious in a developed self.

Thus our study showed us that the purpose of knowledge is a practical one, directed towards the gaining of self-determination through power to control and utilise the environment. A suitable instrument of knowledge is devised for this purpose, the intellect, whose functioning finally manifests itself in the systematic form we call *logic*.

Because Logic, whose primary business is to codify our acquaintance with environment for practical purposes, casting it in such a form that it is independent of concrete instance and individual observer, is enabled to perform this function only through the necessary elimination of the living features of an experience (its individuality, its uniqueness, its personal reference) the picture of the environment it enables us to form is useful but not true. We do not know the Real Environment through logic.

Thus by our very system of intellectual knowledge we create an illusion, the Appearance.

Yet it is not impossible for us to know the

Real Environment. This is given us in the immediate intuition which is prior to all logical process. Generally we pass on at once into the realm of Appearance by forming concepts, but while the experience is being lived we are in contact with the Real.

When our spiritual being is awake we are *aware* of the Real, and the experience of this awareness we term Beauty. But then we are conscious of an unsatisfaction akin to that of one-sided love.

Only in reciprocal personal relationship, or Love, are we at rest while yet in fullest activity of our being; and here, in the actual experiencing of Love, do we know Reality. The moment we begin to reason about it, eliminating the living process of experience, we lose touch again with the Real, and even Love becomes an Appearance. Thus the knowledge of Reality can only be an immediate experience, unique and individual.

How can we know however that this experience is an experience of Reality?

The difficulty of such a theory lies mainly in the fact that it appears to remove us altogether from the possibility of a critique, landing us in the hopeless morass of sophistical scepticism.

But this is avoidable in two ways.

The first, of which we spoke in the last lecture, is this. Although Reality itself is an experience, not a fact isolable by the intellect, yet the intellect, working on this experience, and producing therefrom a dead, unreal fact, does afford

the instrument of a critique. We can compare and discuss the fact generalised from our experience, and if it be identical, or nearly identical, with the fact generalised from the experience of others who claim to have lived the same kind of relation, to have experienced much the same thing, as ourselves, it is reasonable to argue that the living Reality is the same in both cases, since the dead precipitate of that Reality is identical. If he add hydrochloric acid to two clear solutions, and silver chloride comes down in both cases, while other tests fail to reveal the presence of any other substance, the chemist does actually conclude that both were solutions of silver without any further attempt to find the silver when it is actually in solution. So here.

We *can* discuss the experience we call Love; *can* find that others beside ourselves are aware of it as an immediate knowing; a reciprocal, immediate relation; an activity that is timeless, full of a value which is all-sufficient, fulfilling the whole being. We *can* agree as to the immediacy of the I-experience, as to the Reality of the "I" for us. We *can* say that it is the one thing fundamentally true for us.

But in fact we have another test. The Sophist difficulty was this: I intuit one thing, you intuit something quite different. Which is right? There is no means of knowing. The issue is therefore scepticism. There are as many truths as there are beliefs or ideas; that is to say there is no Truth.

The fallacy here lies in saying that the two observers intuit quite different things. They might, if there were no such thing as Reality and (this is the vital point) if that Reality did not centre round the experience of personal beings.

But if the experience of personal beings is essentially the experience of reciprocal personal relation, Love, conditioned ultimately by the Nature of the Personal Being of God, the observers do *not* intuit quite different things, but the same thing, only seen from the angles of *A* and *B* respectively.

But, further than this, our next business is to show that the relation of personal beings is always and without exception based upon, and includes, a Revelation. Our argument has led us to the conception of God as the Ground of all Personal Being, including His own (which last statement means that even God's Being is substantiated by relationship, that is, by its own perpetual denial)[1]. It follows that God as related to us must always be revealing Himself, and hence the Reality experienced by other personal beings must always be fundamentally the same. It is again impossible for *A* to intuit Reality as one thing, *B* as another. Their intuitions of Reality must be similar, though their concepts of Appearance may differ.

We must shortly, then, justify our statement that the relation of personal beings depends always upon a Revelation.

But before doing so we may pause to lay one

[1] See Appendix B.

ghost, the thing-in-itself; for by speaking so constantly of knowledge as dealing with relations, we seem to have resuscitated that grisly spectre.

We have seen that the logical process gives us, and gives us only, knowledge *about* a thing: really, knowledge about it in its relations.

What it gives us varies. To the ordinary man a table is an object with certain space-time relations, of a certain shape, colour, polish, hardness. To the chemist it is an aggregation of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and so on, grouped in molecules and existing in space-time relations more complex than those noted by the ordinary observer. To the physicist it is an agglomeration of electrons, vibrating in certain ways, which may themselves be knots in the ether, or may be something totally different. To the idealist philosopher it is an unreal Appearance in a cosmos whose only Reality is Mind. No wonder the plain man asks in perplexity, What is the table? Each expert concentrates on certain relations, and more or less ignores the others as irrelevant to his purpose. Yet when we consider *what* it is that is all these things to all these people, our first answer is *the table*. Each has constructed an ideal entity out of certain relations, and none of these entities is the table[1].

[1] The table is something some of whose relations selected in different groups give rise to these different concepts. But the real fact is that not the table alone but the table in relation to the percipient is responsible. The concepts

The table, besides being a table, *is* an agglomeration of atoms; it *is*, probably, systems of electrons rotating round central charges; it may be a series of knots in the ether. It is a good many other things as well. We have not got at the real table yet, and we cannot in this intellective way. We can learn a great deal about it by studying its relations, but however long we may go on doing this, the table itself eludes us. It becomes the unknowable thing-in-itself. And the reason is not far to seek. We are going the wrong way to work. We cannot know the table by these intellectual processes; we can only know about it. Actually, the table represents the result of the utilisation of a certain portion of the environment to subserve certain practical ends; comfort in eating, or playing ping-pong. Using the other instrument which we have devised we remember that neither relations nor objects can exist without each other; the Reality of anything consists in the co-existence of the object in all its relations to all percipients.

arose because the table and the person were there, and the person selected certain of its relations with which to form pseudo-concepts and concepts; and then, having formed them, applied them in a practical activity, neglecting in his logical or intellectual process both table and percipient. In doing this he acts in a perfectly legitimate manner *for his practical ends*, which are essentially adaptive; he is only wrong when he says triumphantly "this is the real table." If Reality has anything to do with the sum-total of relations, he has however no right to ignore any of these relations when he talks of the real table; least of all the relation between table and percipient.

Reality is a Whole. You can no more dismember it and still call it real than you can chop a dog's brain into small pieces and call it a dog. *Something* is there when you have chopped up the dog's brain, but its relations are quite different from those of the dog. It is still part of your environment, but a different part.

In fact there is no thing-in-itself; that spectre is a hallucination.

Remove *all* the relations and attributes of a thing, by the exercise of dexterous imagination, and there is *nothing* left.

The reason of this we have made clear in claiming that Reality is relation in process of being experienced, the final Reality personal relation being lived. Reality does not consist in the relations themselves, isolated, any more than it consists in a thing-in-itself; both ideas are concepts, and far removed from any Reality at all; they do not exist. Reality is an experience, not a thing; least of all a thing-in-itself.

We turn now to a very important matter—to the idea that the relation of personal beings is always and essentially a Revelation in its prime moving.

First of all we may observe that every action is creative, introducing a fresh factor into the environment of others. This is true even of the lowest organism. When a sea-anemone expands hungrily, it does in fact alter the environment of neighbouring organisms, and their departure alters the environment of others, and so in widening circles.

But here we must be on our guard. If a stone fall from a neighbouring cliff it alters your environment; markedly so, if you happen to be in the line of its fall. Yet you cannot apply the term "creative activity" to the stone.

Mere alteration of environment is then not creative. What does the anemone do when it expands that differentiates its actions from that of the stone? Clearly, it expands in order to utilise its own environment. The creative aspect comes in from the side of the organism, as an essential of every action that is purposive, in however limited a degree. It is of course something of a violence to language to call this earliest manifestation really creative, for creation implies a conscious act, and the sea-anemone does not know that it is altering the environment of other organisms; but it is none the less the rudiment of creative activity, just as the response to stimulus which causes it to expand is the rudiment of knowledge—of intuition. The rudiment of knowledge (theoretic) issues in the rudiment of response (practical), which response is in a rudimentary form externally creative. Nevertheless the action, however low in grade or simple, does reveal something of the organism: of its nature and its needs.

In man the practical activity is in a great measure conscious, but it is not for the most part purely or intentionally creative, though it does actually create a change, an increase, in the total environment of others, and of the man himself.

It thus belongs still to the practical issue of rational knowledge, more perfect adaptation; and is thus in line with the practical activity of the simple organism. At times however it is definitely directed to the creation of environment as an end, as when we attempt to influence another; and this is the case when the thought of other living beings is present with us.

Here we consciously reveal ourselves, and create consciously. We do not in thought concern ourselves with Appearance and Reality, but in fact we know immediately something of the other being, and our creative action is determined by that knowledge. We are in touch with Reality at one or two points. Here is a self-revelation prompted by some elements of the immediate knowledge that, perfected, becomes synonymous with Love. And what it creates is Real, according to the view we have advocated, because it involves a relationship between persons, and the persons themselves; changing both relationship and persons. Clearly there is continuity throughout the process, from the lowest organism to the highest man. All practical activity is response to environment, but it is also creative response, and it further reveals something about the nature of the organism, and also, to an onlooker, something about the apparent nature, at least, of the environment. With the self-conscious being who has achieved some measure of personality the creative act, when directed towards a person, is definitely a revelation. We show something of

our real self as an offer to which we hope for a responding offer.

Next we may observe that the creation of an artist is always a self-revelation. The artist has expressed to himself an intuition, characterised by the fact that it seems to him to be true and valuable. To him it was beautiful, but its beauty came from the fact that he saw a flash of the Real. Though he may not so formulate it to himself, he has received something, and this gift, this vision, produces in him an inquietude and a yearning, which he strives to satisfy by giving again[1]. He cannot give to the immediate giver; you cannot make an offer to a landscape; and he may not, like some of the great Italians, realise that the Environment is of God and give consciously to Him again; but he gives his vision to mankind in poem or painting or music. He cannot keep it to himself, for it is true, and what is true must be shared. The same impulse animates the preacher, the prophet, yes and the actor; every man who sees a vision. He must proclaim it. Knowledge must issue in activity.

But the proclamation is a self-revelation and an offer. The creative act of a self-conscious being is necessarily revelation, for it is a formal expression of the nature of Personal Being; the creative act of a lower organism, when there is a relation to another being, is also revelatory. The very effort of fish to escape a pursuing porpoise shows that the porpoise has revealed itself as hungry. Indeed, we feel that we know and even

[1] Cf. *Beauty and the Beast.*

in the lesser sense love, a great speaker, a great actor, or a great artist, so much does he reveal himself in his work.

Besides being a formal expression of the nature of Personal Being the artist's work is the formal presentation of an immediately-known Reality; that is, it presents symbolically Personal Being in some of its relations. The relations are an essential part of the Reality.

When we turn to the relation between man and man, between *A* and *B*, the fact of revelation becomes very clear.

We have said before that in a relation between two persons *A* and *B*, *A* cannot know *B* without *B* revealing himself. For *A* to know *B*, *B* must desire to be known by *A*. Moreover he must desire to know *A* himself, for true knowing, or love, is a reciprocal relation. If *B* retreats into his shell, *A* cannot know him. As those marine worms, the Sabellids, slowly emerge from their dull tubes and reveal themselves in waving, exquisite beauty, so must *B* emerge from the dull bodily envelope and show his real self in all the beauty of an unfolding soul. And an essential part of this self-revelation is that it is not only an offer to *A*; it is further the attempt of *B* to know *A*. The revelation of a person who desires to be known by another is also the movement of that person to know the other. It is the offer of Love.

We see Revelation, then, as an offer, but also as the expression of a desire.

This is the clue to the whole matter. For if

we now turn to the Revelation of God we begin to understand that God cannot know us unless we are trying to know Him—know, that is, in the immediate manner of reciprocal relation which we call Love. It is important that the exact meaning of the terms be borne carefully in mind. If it is not, this conclusion will arouse a strong sense of opposition. We are accustomed to say that God knows men who do not know Him; that God loves the sinner though the sinner does not love Him. We here deny both statements. We say that God cannot know us excepting exactly in so far as we know Him; cannot love us excepting exactly in so far as we love Him. We do not, of course, deny for a moment that God knows *about* us, nor that He experiences in the highest degree the yearning and unsatisfaction which we experience in love that is not returned. But we take such knowledge as belonging to the category of the intellectual process which we also call Knowledge; such love to the category of the unsatisfied yearnings produced by the apprehension of the Real when there is no opening for reciprocity, in which we included the yearning aroused by Beauty. In both cases we are dealing with a relation only conscious on one side.

But we note too that we could not possibly know God unless He was first trying to know us. St John states this very concisely. "We love, because He first loved us[1]." We love both God

[1] 1 Jn 4. 19.

and our brother because God first loved us. God is *fons et origo*; out of the Nature of His Being as Love and its self-abnegatory projection in creative activity which reveals that Nature, we and our knowledge and our loves come to be.

But God must reveal Himself before man can know Him, and, conversely, man must reveal himself to God.

Now apply this concretely. We say that God revealed Himself to men through the prophets. What do we mean?

Surely, that the prophets had first a clearer aesthetic vision than most of a Reality that lay behind Appearance, next saw more deeply into the meaning of relations with nature and with their brother men, and finally reached out to seek ultimate values in the Being of God.

This vision, this deeper comprehension, this final reaching out, met equal response from God. Not more than equal; for God cannot go beyond without impugning the freedom of man; cannot force Himself upon man without self-contradiction; cannot indeed love man more than man loves Him (remember the meaning of our terms), for anything else would render love meaningless. But through this response the prophet comes to know God further, since God's Revelation of Himself is spread out, unfolded, an offer and a yearning.

The knowledge he has gained he imparts to others, but in doing so removes it from Reality. You can only tell others *about* God. They must

learn to know Him for themselves. And so the world lags far behind its prophets.

But we can analyse the prophet's revelation a little further.

To him, God is first revealed in His universe and in the love and aspirations of men. He has in fact a developed aesthetic intuition; he can express more than his fellows: that is, he sees more of the something-behind-Appearance. The universe becomes the revelation of God to him. And in the love and aspirations of men too, he sees clear indications of the something-behind-Appearance, and catches a glimpse of its nature. His God is frankly anthropomorphic, but the prophet anthropomorphises for the right reason, not because he believes that God is like men, but because the mutual revelation of men to each other, and their creative activity, and the existence and nature of the universe which is their environment, make him certain that men are like God.

All through, we have seen the Environment as an expression and a revelation of God. It is God's creation, an offer, but it can only find its fulfilment through the understanding and acceptance of those to whom the offer is made, and to these it is a Revelation. The Environment is a limitation of God; the whole of it, or Environment-sum, is, on its Godward side, God Himself living a relation as yet in part imperfect. But God is not the whole Environment. Every living creature adds his quota to it. It is no dead sum-

total, but a growing thing. Men know about it by the intellective or rational process, but this knowing reduces it to Appearance. Matter is Appearance, a construction of the mind; but the Environment itself is Real, though, for the most part, of the lower degrees of Reality: Real, because of its relation to life, of the lower degrees because the relation is mostly one-sided.

Yet men are like God in that they too create Environment, adding to Reality. For Reality is a present experience, a reciprocal relation in process of being lived. There is no Reality save in the life of a living Whole, not isolated unitary Being, but a Unity substantiated in a Multiplicity that lives it.

We see then, that so far from there being no room for Revelation in an evolutionary philosophy of religion, there is no possibility of an evolutionary philosophy of religion without Revelation. Revelation is implicit in every stage when once there is a conscious being to receive it. And even before this, the organism reacts to its Environment, is aware of it in some degree. Something presents itself to the creature, and we have got to find an explanation of this presentation. It is not enough to say the creature is there and the something is there; we men, having reached a further stage of consciousness, demand a reason for the thereness of both creature and environment. We have sufficient ancestral sympathy to accept the thereness of the creature as an end in itself, but the Environment cries aloud

for explanation. We reason about it, we feel our own relation with it, and we finally achieve an explanation of it in terms of the activity of a Personal God.

But even the creature itself pays attention to its Environment, and in the dim beginnings of consciousness feels it has a purpose—narrowly utilitarian, but still a purpose—if we may judge from behaviour; and analogy from our own behaviour encourages us to do so, for we, in the practical mood which occupies most of our energies, assume in the lordliest fashion that our environment exists for our convenience, to subserve our ends.

Only when we begin to be artists, perceivers of the Real, do we begin to wonder whether it is not a manifestation of the activity of God, substantiating His Being in creative Becoming.

Our task is now completed. All that is left for us to do is to turn and survey the cosmogony we have constructed, and our theory of man's knowledge of that cosmogony; and to compare these with the conceptions set forth in the Bible.

Our cosmogony rests upon a conception of God as Personal Being, comprehensible by us because we too are personal, and because we believe that Personality means the same kind of thing when predicated of God as of man. We conceive of Personality as active with a particular activity which we call Love. It is defined by the δύναμις of κοινωνία.

We conceive of Love as a Life being lived: Personality is an absolute Reality only in virtue of process. Being is substantiated in Becoming. We conceive of this process demanding, in the perfect Personality of God, an external creation, for the perfect Self is only substantiated by self-abnegation, self-emptying; the free gift of the perfect experience to others. We conceive the physical environment as in itself, and as Real, to be the expression of this self-limitation of God.

Turning to the creature, we see a gradually-won mastery over the living of life; a dawning freedom through power to make the most of the Environment. We see, as we go up the scale, a widening contact with the Environment, and a growing self-determination. We see the emergence of conscious self-hood. We see the dawn of wonder and speculation, as man gets to know about his Environment. We see him developing an instrument of knowledge for practical purposes; but we also see him living a life which manifests an immediate knowledge. We see him in puzzled fashion applying his practical instrument to speculation, and wondering at the anomalies to which it leads him, yet clinging pathetically to the fragments of that other experience which speculation leaves to him, battered and disfigured; like a child with a broken toy, claiming still, with tears, that he loves it, and that it is his own. We see him touched with a glory in the dawn of Beauty;

hastening to create something worthy of it; filled with longing that he does not understand. We see him satisfied at last, in the full activity of Love, which is rest.

We see him confident of the Love of God, whatever the oppositions of the intellect. We see the child, the wayfaring fool, and the most learned rise to an equality in this one thing; this humble loving trust in the Fatherhood of God, lived as a present experience.

We come, then, to insist on the primacy of experience in process of being lived. We claim that you cannot eliminate this and retain Reality. We claim that Appearance is just what remains when, by an intellectual process, the immediacy of experience is taken away. We claim that Reality is the actual living of personal experience. Because we find that the only experience which suggests perfection is personal relationship, Love, we are driven to conclude that Reality is ultimately Love as an experienced, personal, reciprocal relation, in the very process of that experience; an experience grounded in God.

Where we are in contact with a limited personality, or with a limited manifestation of a personality, the relation is imperfect, generally one-sided; and here we are conscious of a Reality of a lower degree. Of such is born the yearning that the perception of it as Real, together with the unsatisfaction of the one-sidedness of the relation, produce; an attitude familiar to us in Beauty.

We conclude that true Knowledge is immediate experience, while the knowledge whose object is practical adaptation is mediate, and cannot itself bring us to the Real, from the nature of its method in eliminating immediacy.

Finally we claim that because immediate knowledge is knowledge of one object alone, personal relation, we are not landed in the shifting bog of Sophism. And moreover, though intellectual knowledge cannot bring us to Reality, it can furnish a critique of the dead bones of the Reality at which we have arrived, and so assure us of our common ground.

I fear this has been a repetition of a repetition, yet I hope that it was not a vain one. Our two middle lectures were difficult, and it is of fundamental importance for us to have clearly in mind the fact that we have arrived at a conception of Reality which is inseparable from the actual process of living a life.

We saw in our first lecture that Jewish prophet and Jewish thinker insisted always on the living of a life as the one thing that mattered. The Real thing for them was the relation of men with God, and this was a question of conduct.

After all, life always must precede thought; the mass of men grasp reality without being philosophers. Jewish prophet and Jewish teacher were no philosophers, but that did not prevent them from delivering their message with a passionate certainty. If we want truth, unless we are living in a world of illusion, which common

experience denies, our philosophy, if it is to be true to the experience of mankind, must break away from the old intellectualist logic and find another basis. Prophet and teacher of early Palestine proclaimed experience, not reasoning. When they lost touch with this and began to speculate the result was disastrous: how disastrous we can read in the original unmodified Book of Job, and its illegitimate descendant, bastardised by the worst elements of Greek thought, the Book of Ecclesiastes. In the New Testament we find the old, pure line of Jewish teaching raised to a higher power but still the same. Jesus Christ preached and exemplified, not a system of thought, but Reality as a present fact, Eternal Life as a direct experience of Reality—an experience not in some distant future time and state, but in a timeless Now; a condition, not an event. He fulfilled every jot and tittle of the old; the dim flickers of the prophets burst in Him to full radiance. They were right, and He shows that they were right, not by mere statement but by living. Love was His life, God is Love His doctrine; "that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us" His purpose. And, following the Master, the apostles teach the same thing. Truth is a Way, Reality a Life.

From the beginning the Way and the Life have been revealed by God to men who sought that revelation.

Miracle was duly wrought
When, save for it, no faith was possible.
Whether a change were wrought i' the shows of the world,
Whether the change came from our minds which see
Of the shows o' the world so much as, and no more
Than God wills for His Purpose—(what do I
See now, suppose you, there where you see rock
Round us?)—I know not; such was the effect,
So faith grew, making void more miracles
Because too much; they would compel, not help[1].

By miracle, if we choose to call it so (it is a stupid word), God revealed Himself at times; but in truth all His revelation is miracle, or none.

When man, appalled at nature, questioned first
'What if there lurk a might behind this might?'
He needed satisfaction God could give,
And did give, as ye have the written word.

And when man questioned, 'What if there be love
Behind the will and might, as real as they?'
He needed satisfaction God could give,
And did give, as ye have the written word:
And when, beholding that love everywhere,
He reasons, 'since such love is everywhere,
And since ourselves can love and would be loved,
We ourselves make the love, and Christ was not'—
How shall ye help this man who knows himself,
That he must love and would be loved again,
Yet, owning his own love that proveth Christ,
Rejecteth Christ through very need of Him[2].

All our reasoning about it and about has come to this, that when our hearts demand Love, hail Love as Real, we may trust them, whatever the oppositions of the knowledge that is falsely

[1] Browning, *A Death in the Desert*. [2] *Ibid.*

so called. Reality for us is the living of our experience as personal beings. The final Reality is the living of the perfect experience of a Being who is perfectly Personal; an experience which is not isolated, reserved for Him alone, but may be shared and is to be shared, and only fulfils itself in being shared by us.

The self-limitation of God which makes the Environment of men may be a strange conception to us, but after all Christ manifested this to the uttermost in His own *kenosis*. He Himself became part of the personal, bodily Environment of men in order to show that all Environment was God. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father"—hath seen the whole of Godhead; in Appearance manifested in Time and Space, but for those that can look behind Appearance, timeless, in the relation of Love.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness; and the darkness overcame it not. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld His Glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth.

APPENDIX A

THE THEORY OF MIND AS PURE ACT

As I have explained in the preface to these lectures, my acquaintance with Professor Gentile's work has only just begun, and therefore any discussion of this must needs be tentative, and undertaken almost in a spirit of apology. Nevertheless it is clearly necessary that it be discussed, since there is so marked a convergence between my view and his, while yet it seems at first sight as if mine must fall under his final condemnation of mysticism.

As Professor Wildon Carr points out[1], the essential problems of a theory of knowledge of this kind are two. The first arises from the existence of a relation of otherness—an object to be known—on the one hand, and of a knower on the other. "Independent being is by its definition unknowable being, and unknowability cannot be the condition of knowledge." The second arises from the existence of a relation of infinite and finite: if there is a Universal or Infinite, can the finite or limited be real and concrete? Gentile's solution to both problems lies in the conception of one concrete Reality, universal Mind, which functions immanentally and in the region of the finite individual, and because this is its nature, is itself only through such functioning. Reality is thought in the thinking, activity in the happening; eternally present, and so immortal and infinite.

It is not necessary that I should give a detailed

[1] Gentile, *The Theory of Knowledge as Pure Act*. Translator's Introduction.

summary of Gentile's view, far less that I should venture incompetently upon a critique. I propose merely to summarise my own theory in terms which will make it easy for the student of Gentile to see the extent of the parallelism, and lay his finger upon divergences, and here and there myself to point out some issues.

My answer to the first problem depends upon the suggestion that we "know" in two ways, and that these two ways of knowing are concerned respectively with otherness (including multiplicity) and unity. The first "knowing" is practical, and treats its material as objects or others; the second is not exactly theoretical—for the theoretical, I argue, is merely an extension of the practical—but what I prefer to call actual or absolute; concerned with the Real as real, and treating all the material of knowledge as the present functioning of spirit, in relation. But even in the first we accept relation as primary; relation between ourselves and the other, whose absolute otherness is removed by this very relation. As we abstract further, for the purposes of logic, we neglect this primary relation, removing what is individual and unique in the episode for the purpose of generalisation. But in fact the practical knowing, just as much as the absolute knowing, centres in an experience of an individual concrete personality which knows everything through relationship to itself, though it eventually comes to know absolute Reality as reciprocal relationships of personality. The practical knowing is the functioning of imperfect personality in making itself perfect[1]. It treats the world as an object, though the artist, in the perception of beauty (using both terms in the widest possible sense), recognises the relation as real, and sees the world not *simply* as an object.

[1] Here is a clear divergence from Gentile.

My system is thus somewhat frankly dualistic, yet the duality is due to the functioning of Infinite Personality, and is implicit in the nature of this. Infinite Personality—God—contains in Itself the necessity of functioning immanentally, of perpetual self-limitation. Otherness does exist, and is real in a sense to be defined hereafter; there is a dualism associated with Space and Time. Practical knowledge is thus faced with the thing-in-itself, and deals with objects which are unknowable —unknowable, because they are objects, and *qua objects*, are not Real, but Appearances. Practical knowledge at first simply accepts a dualism for practical ends, and keeps in mind the relation to a self, the concrete experience, which leaves a contact with the Real. Only when it abstracts further, again for practical purposes, and then begins to consider this abstraction as true knowledge, does it become perplexed about the thing-in-itself, and naïvely regards the other as purely other. The object is unknowable; concerning it one can know only the relations of the object with the self if one hopes to keep touch at all with reality.

But when the self, and the relations of all contacts, are regarded as parts of one thing, the experience of living spirit, individual yet somehow identical, one approaches the realm of Reality—for Reality is personal experience in process of being experienced. The perfect experience is absolute Reality, and this experience is reciprocal relation, Love, in process of being experienced by persons, and made a concrete universal in the identity of the experience of individual centres of experience—a conception not yet made clear, since we have not considered the experience of God as Ground.

It is evident that a critique of immanental experience is possible, through logic; while yet that critique can never be satisfactory, since logic removes us from the

immediacy of experience being experienced, and so from Reality.

But as personality realises itself a new critique arises, non-logical yet satisfactory: that of experience interpenetratively shared. To anticipate; finite personality acquires infinity through union with Infinite Personality. It thus becomes the fulfilment of the functioning of the Infinite, yet retains its own identity, not as an other, but as a subject-object which knows itself and others in being known; that is, in the activity of pure experience.

This brings us on to the second problem—that of the infinite and the finite personality. Our solution from the Godward side is this: that the Infinite only actualises or substantiates its infinity in denying it; that the one is only one in virtue of experiencing multiplicity; that the condition of being is becoming. In a sense the All is in God, but this does not mean that it is not in itself. The multiplicity of individual persons is real, and those individual persons exist in themselves, and in a sense the All is in each of them, though not in so full a sense as the All is in God.

By this we mean that God is not the All; He could not *be* if He were the All; but none the less all *is* in Him, and because He is that He is the All exists—as His experience which is shared by other personalities. God experiencing is potentially the All, but only because our experiencing becomes ultimately identical with His, in interpenetration, so that the All is in each; and because it is potentially the All, it is also actually the All, since time and succession belong to the lower category of Reality which is derivative from the highest Reality. The highest Reality cannot be conceived as not existing; and it, the functioning of Perfect Personality, is Real as God's experience, which He perpetually denies as pure

Absolute in self-limitation, which is the functioning of Perfect Personality. Otherness does exist; there is a dualism; but it is a dualism associated with Space and Time, that is, associated with God denying Himself as the All. The experience of otherness may however be Real, or it may be Appearance. For God it is always Real, for it is always experienced as integral to the mode of His Personal Being; and for Him it thus is never *simply* other, and therefore is never wholly unknowable. Yet men's activities may be created as *other* by them, through refusal to see them as part of the Real, and then they are unknowable to God, having no place in Reality, but proclaiming that these men hold the unreal as real, and so cut themselves off from Reality and from God. Hence God's dependence upon the good will of man.

But for men the "others" of nature may be simply other, and so unknowable, or they may be seen as God sees them: as Real: as the mode of Becoming: and then they are not unknowable, but are experienced as the process of being of personality.

Thus I take Evolution as really happening. The Being of God actualises itself in the becoming of men, a becoming which is a true development, and which involves for God becoming also. But it is a becoming of Spirit through Spirit. There is nothing Real outside Spirit except Spirit's denial of itself for the purpose of its own fulfilment through the becoming of other spirits; and this, since it is Spirit's activity, is not finally outside Spirit[1]. This summary may help towards a comparison of my system with that of Gentile. To make it clear however it will be of service to consider a few special points of difference.

Intuition. I use this word in rather a special sense, as an awareness of Reality functioning through aware-

[1] See Appendix B.

ness of immediate relation between the ego and an object which is real in that relation. Gentile takes intuition as simple awareness (sensation), but it *includes* relation, and thus does not differ fundamentally from my conception[1].

Love. I point out that love ceases to be love when it is thought about; that it is only itself when it is being experienced. This is, of course, simply a specific implication of the general argument, that directly you get away from the experience itself, and try to universalise it, you cease to be in touch with Reality. The reciprocal aspects of the truth here enunciated are, that the universal is experienced in the particular, and is made Real by this experiencing, and that any attempt to get back from the particular to the universal by any other road than that of the immediate experiencing is doomed to failure since it involves abstraction. Gentile expresses a parallel idea.

> The universal has, even when interpreted in the most complete form—the need of being particularised in the individual....Think the individual, and in thinking it you universalise it. Think the universal and in thinking it you individualise it. So that the enquiry concerning the concept of the individual has always been orientated towards an abstraction, for it starts from an abstraction, namely the concept of the universal as idea to be realised or as category to be individualised....It is by the abstract universal that thought thinks, but the abstract universal is not thought[2].

But my whole theory of Love in process of being experienced by persons as the ultimate Reality, is at variance with Gentile's view, and would, I imagine, be classed by him as Mysticism. Under that heading I propose to make an attempt to justify my synthesis;

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 90. [2] *Op. cit.* pp. 95, 99.

but before doing so one or two other points may be briefly considered.

The finite-infinite personality of man.

The positive is posited in so far as it actually posits itself, re-entering into that being which *is* in so far as it is thought. The positive rather than something posited is really the self-positing of being. Such a standpoint is secure, just because it is the absolute transparence of thought as self-identical in its own act[1].

There is close analogy between this conception and my own, though the two are certainly not identical. I suggest that the individual is real in so far as it makes itself, and is conscious of itself as self; a centre of experience. But I go on further to suggest a reason why it makes itself, depending, as of course it must, on the nature of the universal, though my universal is not quite that of Gentile. Man makes himself because God makes Himself. Man's nature is because of God's Nature—the essential Nature of Personal Being, which was its essential Nature before any individual or specifiable man was[2]. Man is making himself into personal being because God is continuing Himself, or substantiating Himself, as Personal Being. Multiplicity is unity in process; unity only excludes *abstract* multiplicity, which is an unthinkable thought, and therefore unreal[3].

Time and Space. I have presented duration as the process of an ego in becoming itself, as seen by itself regarding itself as an object, and by other egos regarding

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 108.

[2] For the meaning of these temporal terms *v. infra.*

[3] Cf. *op. cit.* p. 111. "The unity of mind excludes only abstract multiplicity, since the unity of mind is in itself a multiplicity, a concrete multiplicity unfolded in the unity of the spiritual process."

it as an object. Duration is arbitrarily transjected into nature, as if proper to that instead of to the process of a percipient viewed externally, so long as nature is regarded, incorrectly, as a self-subsisting other. Eternity is the process of experiencing when the ego realises itself as an ego, and realises the other egos as no longer other, in reciprocal experience; in a sense as "*nos*."

Space is the ego's abstract representation of the conditions of its becoming, of multiplicity, regarded as objects. I am not sure that I have entirely grasped Gentile's thought at this point, but so far as I understand it the two conceptions do not appear to me to be essentially at variance. In so far as the ego has to be regarded as an object, either by God or man, it comes within the spheres of duration and space: these are aspects of the conditions of a process of real becoming.

Immortality. At this point there is a definite divergence, if I understand Gentile aright. On my theory the individual is immortal through continuing its process of relationship eternally without merging it in the One, and I think that my immortal individual carries more of the empirical ego than Gentile would allow to it. His immortal[1] moves in what to me is a somewhat rare atmosphere, and is itself so tenuous in outline that I find it hard to identify in it even the transcendental ego which elsewhere he vindicates. I am not sure that I understand how he avoids the absorption of it into the All, allowing it only to retain such identity as is sufficient for the multiplicity which makes the one-ness of the All. If he does not, it is hard to feel confident that the final value and absolute reality of the transcendental ego is vindicated; and if it is not the whole structure is surely in danger of toppling. On the other

[1] *Op. cit.* chap. x.

hand it is clear that Gentile is anxious to escape such an interpretation. He pleads for the conservation of the categories in the unified Real, claiming that "the eternal reconciliation of reality is displayed in and through all forms which experience indicates in the world[1]." A study so very inadequate as that which I have so far been able to make in the midst of other exacting demands upon my time, gives me no right to offer more than a tentative doubt, for I have not sufficient ground for an opinion. I would rather state here simply that my theory implies a very definite and perfectly individual immortality of the ego, which retains its self-identity completely in union which shows no trace of merging.

Mysticism. But it is clear that I must fall under Gentile's condemnation as a mystic.

The difference between the two conceptions (intellectualism and mysticism) is substantially this:—For the intellectualists the absolute is knowable because in itself it is knowledge; for the mystics the absolute is not knowable because it is not knowledge, but love. And love is distinguished from knowledge in being life, self-transformation, creative process, whereas knowledge supposes (that is, they believe it supposes) a Reality already complete, which has only to be intuited, etc.[2]...The truth is that the real characteristic of intellectualism is not that in which it is opposed to mysticism, but that in which it agrees with it, that is, in its conception of reality as mere absolute object and therefore its conception of the mind's process as a process which *presupposes* an object already realised before the process itself begins[3].

In this respect mysticism is in precisely the same position as intellectualism, and it does not succeed, in spite of all the efforts it makes to conceive the mind as will (feeling,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 267. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 275.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 268.

love), because will is freedom, self-creative; and freedom is impossible where the activity is not absolute....The mystic's absolute reality is not subject but object. It is object, that is to say, from the point of view of actual idealism, because in idealism the subject coincides with the "I" who affirms the object. For even the mystic can speak of the personality, toto coelo different from his own, into relation with which his own personality enters, or aspires to enter. So that he comes to conceive a personality which is an object of his mind,—that is, of the only mind which for him is effectively mind,—and therefore is not mind[1].

Modern Idealism, on the contrary, moves in a direction directly opposite to that towards which mysticism is orientated. Idealism is, as I have said, anti-intellectualistic, and in this sense profoundly christian, if we take the intrinsically moral conception of the world[2]....Christianity discovers the reality which is not until it creates itself, and is what it *creates*. It cannot be treated like the Greek philosopher's world, already in existence and waiting to be known till the philosopher is ready to contemplate it, when he has drawn aside, as it were; when, as Aristotle would say, all the wants of his life are appeased and life as it were complete. It is a reality which waits for us to construct, a reality which is truly even now love and will, because it is the inward effort of the soul, its living process, not its ideal and external model. It is man himself who rises above humanity and becomes God. And even God is no longer a reality who already is, but the God who is begotten in us and is ourselves in so far as we with our whole being rise to him. Here mind is no longer intellect but will. The world is no longer what is known but what is made: and therefore not only can we begin to conceive the mind as freedom or moral activity, but the world, the whole world of the christian, is freed and redeemed. The whole world is a world which is what it would be, or a world, as we say, essentially moral[3].

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 269. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 270.

Now it is quite clear that the God I have throughout vindicated is "a reality who already is" in one sense; a Personality into relation with which our own Personality enters or aspires to enter. Yet it is important to observe three things. First, that this Personality is not "toto coelo different" from our own. I have stated emphatically again and yet again that personality means only one thing, the same for God and for man[1].

Furthermore I have emphasised repeatedly that it seems to me impossible to conceive of any meaning in the statement that God is. His Becoming, His Activity, substantiates His Being, and without it He could not be at all[2]. But I wholly agree, and have stated again and again, that this does imply an "otherness," a multiplicity which is not a unity, an element of the not-real, in the conditions of becoming, that is, in Time and Space. This is merely another way of saying that God as well as man is in very truth Becoming, and this Becoming substantiates His Being, for the final issue is an interpenetration of personalities which are ultimately identical in experience, and therefore constitute a unity which is through multiplicity, while yet the centres of experience retain their self-identity, making the multiplicity of the One real and eternal.

My second observation is, that I do assume God to be the Ground of all, already existent before any individual ego, if we regard Him from the standpoint of the individual ego, from which standpoint alone can we use any term implying antecedence. For Him there is no antecedence, except in relation to the imperfect

[1] Cf. especially *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity*, chaps. I and II, and Preliminary Considerations.

[2] *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity* passim, and the present work, as well as implicitly and explicitly in my earlier books.

ego which is becoming. Reality must be for Him eternal act; but it is true to say that for Him the process of man's ego, in so far as it is not in relation with Him, is not finally Real, but is external object. This is the meaning of His self-limitation. But I fail to see that this assumption really lands us in the slough of mysticism.

Lastly, I would point out that it seems to me we avoid the other fallacy of mysticism in our differentiation of the two kinds of knowledge, and in our final identification of the second kind of knowledge with Love, whereby this knowledge does indeed become pure act, and whereby living is vindicated as that act in process. We here differentiate mere existence as an other, unreal in the absolute sense, from living in the true sense; the sense of St John's interpretation "And this is life eternal, that they should *know* thee the only true God." Knowledge, love, being, each become real, and all become identical, in the process of living, which is pure activity. Our God is, we agree, an abstract, unreal *conception*, but even here and now He is, or may be, an experience lived. We make Him: without our making He could not be; but this is true only because of the mode of His Being: His self-abnegation and self-limitation which are essential moments of it and which make us. He is the Ground of all, and because of this there is an All, a One, whose unity is unity because of us who are essentials of Its multiplicity.

APPENDIX B

INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITATION

THIS concept is a difficult one. The problem formulates the question, whether it is possible to conceive of the intrinsic nature of a subject as involving the creation of a limitation external to itself. Stated in this form the answer is clearly in the negative. If you conceive an "Is," absolute in essence, which makes itself in any degree an "is not" by its own functioning, you are clearly up against a contradiction in terms; and the creation of a limitation external to itself would do exactly this. But such an idea is really very far from the concept we have enunciated. The fallacy lies in a confusion between simple Being, whose reality we deny, and an eternal activity which is substantiated as Real by act. We do not and cannot say that God is; the idea is found to be empty of content on a last analysis. We do say that God is Love; an expression that implies a unity only substantiated by multiplicity, a reality made real by act and process. Now the nature of Personality is identical throughout, and connotes freedom, creativeness and self-identity, as well as the capacity for reciprocal relation. Thus the creation of other persons is the essential activity of Perfect Personality, in order that reciprocal relation may *be*. When relation is perfected the creation becomes the activity of the One, which is the all made one in its multiplicity; but before it is perfected the All has no existence, though the multiplicity has. ("Before" here clearly connotes process, not merely time.) Thus, in order that God may be Love; in order that His Activity may substantiate His

Being as Reality; it is essential that His personality fulfil itself through other personalities whose freedom is a constraint upon His freedom. The clue is found in the fact that Personality means the same thing throughout: God's creation is not the creation of something that is intrinsically other. Intrinsically it is of the same nature as God Himself; only as an "accident" is it other, though its otherness is an inevitable phase, not ultimately real in itself, but real as long as it remains a part of the experience of God, which is determined by His Nature as Personality in action.

This aspect of personality also determines our understanding of the concept of the world as an object. It is never, for ultimate analysis, an object; but ultimate analysis is only achieved in the activity of personal being. So long as that activity, that love, that reciprocal relation between persons, is imperfect; so long also as the conditions of personality are regarded abstractly in logical form; so long the world remains object to a subject, because the subject does not comprehend Being as the pure activity of reciprocal relation. In simple phrase, man is not in perfect relation with God, and therefore cannot see as God sees. Yet for God too the cosmos must be object, till relation be perfect. The object is the positing of imperfect relation, pure and simple; and therefore something equivalent to object must be within the experience of God as well as of man; and this is what we imply when we speak of His self-limitation.

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